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I. INTRODUCTION
A decade ago, I studied and reported on the probative force of'"physical
facts" in New Mexico jurisprudence. 1 As I broadened my base of investigation, I formed the impression that of all the opinions employing the phrase
"physical facts," a disproportionate number occurred in only a few states,
and substantially more occurred in Missouri than in any other state. This
Article examines the Missouri cases and reappraises my former conclusions
about the significance of "physical facts" rhetoric and reasoning for the
jurisprudence of judicial proof.
The phrase "physical facts" has appeared in 348 Missouri appellate
opinions since 1945,2 which is ninety-nine cases more than the number
generated by Missouri's closest competitor. 3 The phrase also appeared
in many Missouri appellate opinions before 1945.4 It appears predominantly
1. Hoffman, The "Physical FactsRule": To Seem Is To Be?, 2 N.M.L. REV.
53 (1972).
2. Search of the appropriate Missouri libraries of the Lexis© computer
research service conducted on May 17, 1982.
3. Search of all appropriate state libraries of the Lexis© computer research
service conducted on May 17, 1982. Virginia had 249 cases. Other states with inordinate numbers of physical facts cases are Louisiana, 230; California, 215; Pennsylvania, 176; New York, 147; Illinois, 142; and Texas, 127. These figures are stated
only as a matter of general interest, and no precise statistical inferences are intended.
4. See, e.g., McCurry v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 1199, 181 S.W.2d 529 (1944);
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/1
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in tort cases and, among tort cases, predominantly in cases arising from5
the allegedly negligent or wanton operation of an automobile,

Laughlin v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 163 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1942); Burneson v. Zumwalt Co., 349 Mo. 94, 159 S.W.2d 605 (1941); Walter v. Alt, 348 Mo. 53, 152
S.W.2d 135 (1941); Davis v. F.M. Stamper Co., 347 Mo. 761, 148S.W.2d 765
(1941); Murphy v. Fred Wolferman, Inc., 347 Mo. 634, 148 S.W.2d 481 (1941);
Rose v. Thompson, 346 Mo. 395, 141 S.W.2d 824 (1940); Tate v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 339 Mo. 262, 96 S.W.2d 364 (1936); Gwaltney v. Kansas City S.R.R.,
339 Mo. 249, 96 S.W.2d 357 (1936); Carner v. St. Louis-S.F.R.R., 338 Mo. 257,
89 S.W.2d 947 (1935); Dempsey v. Horton, 337 Mo. 379, 84 S.W.2d 621 (1935);
Wise v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 335 Mo. 1168, 76 S.W.2d 118 (1934); Parrent
v. Mobile & O.R.R., 334 Mo. 1202, 70 S.W.2d 1068 (1934); Hardin v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 334 Mo. 1169, 70 S.W.2d 1'075 (1934); Clark v. Atchison & E. Bridge
Co., 333 Mo. 721, 62 S.W.2d 1079 (1933); Parker v. St. Louis-S.F.R.R., 41
S.W.2d 386 (Mo. 1931); Clark v. Atchison & E. Bridge Co., 324 Mo. 544, 24
S.W.2d 143 (1929); Henry v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 319 Mo. 432, 3 S.W.2d 1004
(En Banc 1928); Payne v. Chicago &A.R.R., 136 Mo. 562, 38 S.W. 308 (En Banc
1896); Bowman v. Moore, 237 Mo. App. 1163, 167 S.W.2d 675 (K.C. 1942);
Davidsonv. Missouri Orpheum Corp., 236 Mo. App. 1025, 161 S.W.2d 707 (K.C.
1942); Tramill v. Prater, 236 Mo. App. 757, 152 S.W.2d 684 (K.C. 1941); Bauer
v. Wood, 236 Mo. App. 266, 154 S.W.2d 356 (St. L. 1941); Little v. Manufacturers R.R., 145 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. App., St. L. 1940); Freed v. Mason, 137 S.W.2d
673 (Mo. App., K.C. 1940); Robards v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 233 Mo.
App. 962, 125 S.W.2d 891 (K.C. 1939); Person v. City of Independence, 114
S.W.2d 175 (Mo. App., K.C. 1938); Birdsong v. Jones, 225 Mo. App. 242, 30
S.W.2d 1094 (K.C. 1930); Aldridge v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 215 Mo. App. 217,
256 S.W. 93 (K.C. 1923); Warnke v. A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co., 186 Mo. App.
30, 171 S.W. 643 (St. L. 1914); Faggv. Missouri &N.A.R.R., 185 Mo. App. 79,
170 S.W. 912 (Spr. 1914); Yonkers v. St. Louis, I.M. & S.R.R., 182 Mo. App.
558, 168 S.W. 307 (St. L. 1914); Daniels v. Kansas City Elevated R.R., 177 Mo.
App. 280, 164 S.W. 154 (K.C. 1914); Phillips v. Southwest Mo. R.R., 170 Mo.
App. 416, 155 S.W. 470 (Spr. 1913); Klass v. Metropolitan St. R.R., 169 Mo.
App. 617, 155 S.W. 57 (K.C. 1913); Elliot v. Metropolitan St. R.R., 157 Mo. App.
517, 138 S.W. 663 (K.C. 1911); Berry v. Metropolitan St. R.R., 156 Mo. App.
560, 137 S.W. 602 (K.C. 1911); Zalotuchin v. Metropolitan St. R.R., 127 Mo.
App. 577, 106 S.W. 548 (K.C. 1907); Berger v. Chicago &A.R.R., 97 Mo. App.
127, 71 S.W. 102 (K.C. 1902).
5. See, e.g., Welch v. Hyatt, 578 S.W.2d 905 (Mo. En Banc 1979); Epple
v. Western Auto Supply Co., 548 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. En Banc 1977); Commerford
v. Kreitler, 462 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. 1971); Headrick v. Dowdy, 450 S.W.2d 161 (Mo.
1970); Turner v. Cowart, 450 S.W.2d 441 (Mo 1969); Ellison v. Simmons, 447
S.W.2d 66 (Mo. 1969); Hamilton v. Slover, 440 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. 1969); Richardson v. Moreland, 435 S.W.2d 335 (Mo. 1968); Hecker v. Schwartz, 426 S.W.2d
22 (Mo. 1968); Clevenger v. Walters, 419 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. En Banc 1967); Prentzler v. Schneider, 411 S.W.2d 135 (Mo. En Banc 1966); Hewitt v. Masters, 406
S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1966); Moore v. Eden, 405 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. 1966); Taylor v.
Riddle, 384 S.W.2d 569 (Mo. 1964); Anderson v. Duckworth, 383 S.W.2d 726
(Mo. 1964); Boydston v. Burton, 379 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. 1964); Terminal
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Warehouses of St. Joseph, Inc. v. Reiners, 371 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. 1963); Rollins
v. Postlewait, 358 S.W.2d 828 (Mo. 1962); Carlson v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co.,
358 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1962); Millerv. Watkins, 355 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1962); Probst
v. Seyer, 353 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1962); Clark v. Simmons, 351 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.
1961); Stodgell v. Mounter, 344 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. 1961); Justice v. Malin, 336
S.W.2d 77 (Mo. 1960); Herr v. Ruprecht, 331 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1960); Pender
v. Foeste, 329 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1959); Page v. Hamilton, 329 S.W.2d 758 (Mo.
1959); Rosenfeld v. Peters, 327 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. 1959); Waldrip v. American
Buslines, Inc., 327 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. 1959); Hickerson v. Portner, 325 S.W.2d
783 (Mo. 1959); Pitts v. Garner, 321 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. 1959);Johnson v. Presley,
320 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1959); Allen v. Hayen, 320 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1959);
Welcome v. Braun, 319 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. 1958); Creechv. Blackwell, 318 S.W.2d
342 (Mo. 1958); Ilgenfritz v. Quinn, 318 S.W.2d 186 (Mo. 1958); Fenneren v.
Smith, 316 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1958); Davis v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 316 S.W.2d
494 (Mo. 1958); Loveless v. Locke Distrib. Co., 313 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. 1958); Myers
v. Moffett, 312 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1958); Wilson v. Toliver, 305 S.W.2d 423 (Mo.
1957); Anderson v. Bell, 303 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. 1957); Teters v. Kansas City Pub.
Serv. Co., 300 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. 1957); Huffman v. Mercer, 295 S.W.2d 27 (Mo.
1956); Peterson v. Tiona, 292 S.W.2d 581 (Mo. 1956); Williams v. Ricklemann,
292 S.W.2d 276 (Mo. 1956); Clemons v. Becker, 283 S.W.2d 449 (Mo. 1955);
Smith v. Siercks, 277 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1955); Largo v. Bonadonna, 269 S.W.2d
879 (Mo. 1954); Hayes v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 269 S.W.2d 639 (Mo. 1954);
Breshears v. Myers, 266 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1954); Lansford v. Southwest Lime Co.,
266 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1954); Paydon v. Globus, 262 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. En Banc
1953); Duffy v. Rohan, 259 S.W.2d 839 (Mo. 1953); Douglas v. Twenter, 364 Mo.
71, 259 S.W.2d 353 (1953); Roush v. Alkire Truck Lines, 245 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1952);
Thompson v. Byers Transp. Co., 362 Mo. 42, 239 S.W.2d 498 (1951); Pearson
v. Kansas City Ice Co., 361 Mo. 363, 234 S.W.2d 783 (1950); Sams v. Adams
Transfer & Storage Co., 234 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1950); Wilkins v. Stuecken, 359
Mo. 1047, 225 S.W.2d 131 (1949); Ayres v. Key, 359 Mo. 341, 221 S.W.2d 719
(1949); Mavrakos v. Mavrakos Candy Co., 356 Mo. 649, 223 S.W.2d 383 (1949);
Yeaman v. Storms, 358 Mo. 774, 217 S.W.2d 495 (En Banc 1948); Hall v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 358 Mo. 313, 214 S.W.2d 438 (1948); Cooper v. Kansas City Pub.
Serv. Co., 356 Mo. 482, 202 S.W.2d 42 (En Banc 1947); Sawyer v. Winterholder,
195 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. 1946); Atkinson v. Be-Mac Transp., Inc., 595 S.W.2d 26
(Mo. App., E.D. 1980); White v. Gallion, 573 S.W.2d 682 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978);
Becker v. Finke, 567 S.W.2d 136 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); Hubbard v. Lathrop,
545 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976); Cosens v. Smith, 528 S.W.2d 772 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1975); Anderson v. Sellers, 521 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975);
Yeager v. Buffington, 450 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. App., K.C. 1970); Shelton v. Bruner,
449 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. App., Spr. 1969); Long v. E.B. Koonce Mortuary, Inc.,
446 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App., St. L. 1969); Walker v. Massey, 417 S.W.2d 14 (Mo.
App., Spr. 1967); Dolan v. D.A. Lubricant Co., 416 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. App., K.C.
1967); Williams v. Boone, 413 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. App., St. L. 1967); Roark v.
Gunter, 404 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App., K.C. 1966); McClung v. White, 386 S.W.2d
678 (Mo. App., K.C. 1964); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App., St. L. 1964);
Reynolds v. Consolidated Cabs, Inc., 374 S.W.2d 955 (Mo. App., K.C. 1964);
Stepp v. Rainwater, 373 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. App., K.C. 1963); Anthony v. Jennings, 368 S.W.2d 533 (Mo. App., K.C. 1963); Moore v. Glasgow, 366 S.W.2d
475 (Mo. App., Spr. 1963); Sisk v. Driggers, 364 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. App., K.C.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/1
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train, 6 or other vehicle. 7 Not surprisingly, the phrase "physical facts"
appears also in criminal assault, 8 rape,9 and homicide10 cases, which,

1962); Woodv. Ezell, 342 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. App., Spr. 1961); Leavittv. St. Louis
Pub. Serv. Co., 340 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. App., St. L. 1960); Fidelity &Casualty Co.
v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 337 S.W.2d 566 (Mo. App., St. L. 1960); Williams
v. Kaestner, 332 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. App., St. L. 1960); Woods v. Dalton, 331 S.W.2d
132 (Mo. App., St. L. 1960); Harrellson v. Barks, 326 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. App.,
Spr. 1959); James v. Berry, 301 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. App., Spr. 1957).
6. See, e.g., Paige v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 323 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1959); Atkinson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 316 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1958); Lang v. St. LouisS.F. Ry., 364 Mo. 1147, 273 S.W.2d 270 (1954); Hackett v. Wabash R.R., 271
S.W.2d 573 (Mo. 1954); Marshall v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 361 Mo. 234, 234 S.W.2d
524 (En Banc 1950); Donald v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 231 S.W.2d 627 (Mo.
1950); Boehrer v. Thompson, 359 Mo. 465, 222 S.W.2d 97 (1949); Doyel v.
Thompson, 357 Mo. 963, 211 S.W.2d 704 (1948); Reeves v. Thompson, 357 Mo.
847, 211 S.W.2d 23 (1948); Shelton v. Thompson, 353 Mo. 964, 185 S.W.2d 777
(1945); Dodd v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 353 Mo. 799, 184 S.W.2d 454 (1945);
Wiseman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 575 S.W.2d 742 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); Walters
v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 569 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); Hupman v.
Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 429 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. App., K.C. 1968); Throckmorton v. Wabash R.R., 409 S.W.2d 260 (Mo. App., K.C. 1966); Fugate v. St. LouisS.F. Ry., 348 S.W.2d 718 (Mo. App., Spr. 1961).
7. See, e.g., Bounds v. Scott Constr. Co., 498 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1973) (road
grader); Day v. Union Pac. R.R., 276 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. 1955) (tractor-trailer);
Romandel v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 254 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. 1953) (streetcar);
Abernathyv. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 362 Mo. 214, 240 S.W.2d 914 (1951) (streetcar); Harrow v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 361 Mo. 42, 233 S.W.2d 644 (1950)
(streetcar);Johnson v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 360 Mo. 429, 228 S.W.2d 796
(1950) (streetcar); Piehlerv. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 360 Mo. 12,226 S.W.2d
681 (1950) (streetcar); Pearson v. Kansas City Pub. Ser,. Co., 359 Mo. 1185, 225
S.W.2d 742 (En Banc 1950) (streetcar); Penn v. Columbia Asphalt Co., 513 S.W.2d
679 (Mo. App., K.C. 1974) (asphalt roller).
8. See, e.g., State v. Cooksey, 499 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. 1973); State v. Bevineau,
460 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 1970); State v. Cody, 379 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. 1964); State
v. Dunbar, 360 Mo. 788, 230 S.W.2d 845 (1950); State v. Campbell, 543 S.W.2d
508 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
9. See, e.g., State v. Parton, 487 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. 1972); State v. Lee, 404
S.W.2d 740 (Mo. 1966); State ex rel. Wilkins v. Markway, 353 S.W.2d 727 (Mo.
1962); State v. McMillian, 338 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. 1960); State v. Swinburne, 324
S.W.2d 746 (Mo. En Banc 1959); State v. Baugh, 323 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. En Banc
1959); State v. Palmer, 306 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1957); State v. Weekly, 223 S.W.2d
494 (Mo. 1949); State v. Wood, 355 Mo. 1008, 199 S.W.2d 396 (1947); State v.
Burton, 355 Mo. 792, 198 S.W.2d 19 (1946); State v. Phillips, 585 S.W.2d 517 (Mo.
App., S.D. 1979); State v. Russell, 581 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979); State
v. Leigh, 580 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979); State v. Tripp, 558 S.W.2d 809
(Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
10. See, e.g., State v. Newberry, 605 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1980); State v. Gotthardt, 540 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. En Banc 1976); State v. Chamineak, 343 S.W.2d 153
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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like physical tort cases, concern incidents of historical occurrence the
proof of which can be measured against circumstances. The phrase has
also appeared in certain kinds of real property cases, particularly in quiet
or title, 12 and in actions for
title suits," in related contests about right
3
property.1
real
to
trespassory damages
In most of the cases, the phrase implies an evaluation of the visually
perceptible phenomena surrounding an accident or other incident, although
in one significant case, 1 4 "physical facts" reasoning has been carried
beyond the reach of the five senses. Missouri is one of only thirteen
states in which appellate courts have, on occasion, written incautiously
of a "physical facts rule' ' 1 5 and is the second worst offender in numbers
of this slip of the pen.16 Still, Missouri's courtshave, with certain exceptions, not allowed the careless thinking and marginal advocacy characteristic
of most invocations of physical facts to get out of hand.
The concepts comprising the jurisprudence of proof-sufficiency of
evidence, inferences and presumptions, circumstantial evidence, judicial
(Mo. 1961); State v. Thomas, 309 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. 1958); State v. Morris, 307
S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1957); State v. Moore, 303 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. En Banc 1957); State
v. Dill, 282 S.W.2d 456 (Mo. 1955); State v. Booker, 365 Mo. 75, 276 S.W.2d
104 (En Banc 1955); State v. Smith, 261 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1953); State v. Medlin,
355 Mo. 564, 197 S.W.2d 626 (1946); State v. Holland, 354 Mo. 527, 189 S.W.2d
989 (1945); State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945); State v. King, 564
S.W.2d 592 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978); State v. Harley, 543 S.W.2d 288 (Mo. App.,
Spr. 1976); State v. Duncan, 540 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); State v.
Ball, 529 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975); State v. Davis, 504 S.W.2d 221
(Mo. App., K.C. 1973); State v. Tindall, 496 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. App., K.C. 1973).
11. See, e.g., Miller v. Medley, 281 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1955); Wilson v. Sherman, 573 S.W.2d 456 (Mo. App., Spr. 1978); Clevenger v. Mueller, 547 S.W.2d
173 (Mo. App., Spr. 1977).
12. See, e.g., Walters v. Tucker, 308 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1957) (adverse possession); Cantrell v. City of Caruthersville, 359 Mo. 282, 221 S.W.2d 471 (1949) (suit
to determine title); Jordan v. Parsons, 239 Mo. App. 766, 199 S.W.2d 881 (St.
L. 1947) (suit to enjoin fencing road).
13. See, e.g., Breshears v. Union Elec. Co., 347 S.W.2d 233 (Mo. En Banc
1961) (flood damage); Behm v. King Louie's Bowl, Inc., 350 S.W.2d 285 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1961) (same).
14. State v. Duncan, 540 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976). See Part II.
B.3. infra.
15. See Vaeth v. Gegg, 486 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Mo. 1972); Anderson v.
Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc., 393 S.W.2d 452, 460 (Mo. 1965); Kiburz v.
Loc-Wood Boat & Motors, Inc., 356 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Mo. 1962); Atkinson v.
Be-Mac Transp., Inc., 595 S.W.2d 26, 30 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); State v. Duncan, 540 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); State v. Davis, 504 S.W.2d
221, 223 (Mo. App., K.C. 1973).
16. Search of all appropriate state libraries of the Lexis©computer research
service conducted on May 17, 1982. The worst offenders are Pennsylvania, 23 cases;
Missouri, 7 cases; and New Mexico, 5 cases. No other state has more than two cases.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/1
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notice, and the pseudo-rules of proof, including the so-called "physical
facts rule"-can be employed to encroach on the right to trial by jury.
Indeed, the entire law of proof in jury cases should be treated as corollary
to that right, which must, if it is to mean anything, mean more than
a right merely to have a jury empanelled as passive observers for some
part of the proceedings. The carelessness, studied or unstudied, with
which the law of proof is typically applied enables judges so inclined
to decide cases themselves while professing fidelity to and enthusiasm
for the right to trial by jury.
Counsel desiring determination by jury is helpless to prevent this
usurpation, unless he is armed with a solid understanding of the rules
and pseudo-rules, so seemingly value-neutral and authoritative, being
invoked against his case. Counsel who can, for example, show the court
that the use of physical facts reasoning urged by opposing counsel exceeds
the legitimate theoretical and logical limits of the doctrine will either
persuade the court to send his case to the jury or at least unmask the
court's directed verdict for what it is, an unprincipled encroachment of
a constitutional right. The Missouri decisions examined in this Article
include several in which good advocacy, knowledge plus execution, have
saved a plaintiff's case from an unjustified directed verdict.' 7
Although casual references to the phrase abound, 1 8 physical facts reasoning is purposefully invoked in predictably recurrent forensic environments.
17. See, e.g., Silvey v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 445 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. 1969); Ruhl
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 304 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1957).
18. See, e.g., State v. Parton, 487 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. 1972); State v. Cannon,
486 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. 1972); State v. Walsh, 484 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. En Banc 1972);
State v. Starks, 472 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. 1971); State v. Simerly, 463 S.W.2d 846
(Mo. 1971); Tucker v. Central Hardware Co., 463 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. 1971); Garton v. State, 454 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1970); State v. Stidham, 449 S.W.2d 634 (Mo.
1970); Richardson v. Moreland, 435 S.W.2d 335 (Mo. 1968); Jackson v. Haley,
432 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1968); Hecker v. Schwartz, 426 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1968);
Bunyard v.Turley, 425 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. 1968); Clevengerv. Walters, 419 S.W.2d
102 (Mo. En Banc 1967); State v. Carey, 411 S.W.2d 243 (Mo. 1967); City of
Monett v. Buchanan, 411 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. 1967); Davis v. City of Independence,
404 S.W.2d 718 (Mo. En Banc 1966); Mitchell v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 396 S.W.2d
647 (Mo. 1965); Merriman v. Ben Gutman Truck Serv., Inc., 392 S.W.2d 292
(Mo. 1965); State v. Cody, 379 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. 1964); Mount Olivet Baptist
Church v. George, 378 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. 1964); Terminal Warehouses of St.
Joseph, Inc. v. Reiners, 371 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. 1963); State v. Ramsey, 368 S.W.2d
413 (Mo. 1963); Carlson v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 358 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1962);
Miller v. Watkins, 355 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1962); Clark v. Simmons, 351 S.W.2d 1
(Mo. 1961); Breshears v. Union Elec. Co., 347 S.W.2d 233 (Mo. En Banc 1961);
State v. Edmonds, 347 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. 1961); Stodgell v. Mounter, 344 S.W.2d
100 (Mo. 1961); Bean v. Ross Mfg. Co., 344 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. En Banc 1961); State
v. Sarten, 344 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1961); State v. Chamineak, 343 S.W.2d 153 (Mo.
1961); Justice v. Main, 336 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. 1960); Johnson v. Missouri-Kan.Tex. R.R., 334 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1960); Herr v. Ruprecht, 331 S.W.2d 642 (Mo.
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1960); State v. Akers, 328 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. 1959); State v. Swinburne, 324 S.W.2d
746 (Mo. En Banc 1959); Lynn v. Kern, 323 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. 1959); Pitts v.
Garner, 321 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. 1959); Giambelluca v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 320
S.W.2d 457 (Mo. 1959); Allen v. Hayen, 320 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1959); Welcome
v. Braun, 319 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. 1958); Ilgenfritz v. Quinn, 318 S.W.2d 186 (Mo.
1958); Creech v. Blackwell, 318 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. 1958); State v. Moss, 316 S.W.2d
539 (Mo. 1958); Davis v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 316 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1958);
Logsdon v. Duncan, 316 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. 1958); Goodman v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
312 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1958); State v. Butler, 310 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. 1958); Mallett
v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 308 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. 1957); Walters v. Tucker, 308
S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1957); Wilkins v. Allied Stores, 308 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1958);
State v. Morris, 307 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1957); Wilson v. Toliver, 305 S.W.2d 423
(Mo. 1957); State v. Moore, 303 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. En Banc 1957); Wiser v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 301 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. 1957); Teters v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 300
S.W.2d 511 (Mo. 1957); Gerhard v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 299 S.W.2d 866 (Mo.
En Banc 1957); Heppner v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 297 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. 1956);
Parker v. Ford Motor Co., 296 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1956); Peterson v. Tiona, 292
S.W.2d 581 (Mo. 1956); Williams v. Ricklemann, 292 S.W.2d 276 (Mo. 1956);
Hickey v. Kansas City S. Ry., 290 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1956); Herrold v. Hart, 290
S.W.2d 49 (Mo. 1956); State v. Dill, 282 S.W.2d 456 (Mo. 1955); Millerv. Medley,
281 S.W.2d 797 (Mo. 1955); Dayv. Union Pac. R.R., 276 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. 1955);
Jaeger v. Reynolds, 276 S.W.2d 182 (Mo. 1955); State v. Booker, 365 Mo. 75,
276 S.W.2d 104 (En Banc 1955); Peterson v. Brune, 273 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1954);
Hackett v. Wabash R.R., 271 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. 1954); Perkins v. Byrnes, 364 Mo.
849, 269 S.W.2d 52 (1954); Brandock v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 269 S.W.2d
93 (Mo. En Banc 1954); Breshears v. Myers, 266 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. 1954); Hammond v. Crown Coach Co., 364 Mo. 508, 263 S.W.2d 362 (1954); Paydon v.
Globus, 262 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. En Banc 1953); State v. Smith, 365 Mo. 1075, 261
S.W.2d 50 (1953); Gaddy v. Skelly Oil Co., 364 Mo. 143, 259 S.W.2d 844 (1953);
Guy v. Kansas City, 257 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1953); Curry v. Thompson, 363 Mo.
348, 247 S.W.2d 792 (1952); Enyart v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 363 Mo. 346,
241 S.W.2d 268 (1951); State v. Dupepe, 241 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1951); Pearson v.
Kansas City Ice Co., 361 Mo. 363, 234 S.W.2d 783 (1950); Sams v. Adams
Transfer & Storage Co., 234 S.W.2d 593 (Mo. 1950); State v. Dunbar, 360 Mo.
788, 230 S.W.2d 845 (1950); Johnson v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 360 Mo.
429, 228 S.W.2d 796 (1950); Piehler v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 360 Mo. 12,
226 S.W.2d 681 (1950); Pearson v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 359 Mo. 1185,
225 S.W.2d 742 (En Banc 1950); Wilkins v. Stuecken, 359 Mo. 1047, 225 S.W.2d
131 (1949); Dodson v. Maddox, 359 Mo. 742, 223 S.W.2d 434 (1949); Nildas v.
Metz, 359 Mo. 601, 222 S.W.2d 795 (1949); Boehrer v. Thompson, 359 Mo. 465,
222 S.W.2d 97 (1949); Ayres v. Key, 359 Mo. 341, 221 S.W.2d 719 (1949); Cantrell v. City of Caruthersville, 359 Mo. 282, 221 S.W.2d 471 (1949); Yeaman v.
Storms, 358 Mo. 774, 217 S.W.2d 495 (En Banc 1948); Hill v. Terminal R.R.
Ass'n, 358 Mo. 597, 216 S.W.2d 487 (En Banc 1948); Hall v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 358 Mo. 313, 214 S.W.2d 438 (1948); Lance v. Van Winkle, 358 Mo. 143,
213 S.W.2d 401 (1948); Doyel v. Thompson, 357 Mo. 963, 211 S.W.2d 704 (1948);
Reeves v. Thompson, 357 Mo. 847, 211 S.W.2d 23 (1948); State v. Medlin, 355
Mo. 564,197 S.W.2d 626 (1946); Sawyer v. Winterholder, 195 S.W.2d 569 (Mo.
1946); State v. Holland, 354 Mo. 527, 189 S.W.2d 989 (1945); State v. Cole, 354
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Mo. 181,188 S.W.2d43 (1945); Dodd v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 353 Mo. 799,
184 S.W.2d 454 (1945); State v. Siraguso, 610 S.W.2d 338 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980);
Stapleton v. Griewe, 602 S.W.2d 810 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980); Wilson v. Sherman, 573 S.W.2d 456 (Mo. App., Spr. 1978); State v. King, 564 S.W.2d 592 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1978); MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thost, 561 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. App., St.
L. 1978); State v. Hughes, 548 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977); Crawford v.
Pacific W. Mobile Estates, Inc., 548 S.W.2d 216 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977); Clevenger
v. Mueller, 547 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. App., St. L. 1977); Hubbard v. Lathrop, 545
S.W.2d 361 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976); State v. Harley, 543 S.W.2d 288 (Mo. App.,
Spr. 1976); State v. Campbell, 543 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); State v.
Taylor, 542 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Lindquist v. Container Corp.,
537 S.W.2d 676 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); State v. Watson, 536 S.W.2d 59 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1976); State v. Proctor, 535 S.W.2d 141 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976);
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 534 S.W.2d 474 (Mo. App., K.C. 1975); State
v. Ball, 529 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975); Cosens v. Smith, 528 S.W.2d
772 (Mo. App., K.C. 1975); State v. Scott, 525 S.W.2d 410 (Mo. App., K.C.
1975); State v. Gardner, 518 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. App., Spr. 1975); Frazier v. Stone,
515 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. App., Spr. 1974); State v. Fisher, 504 S.W.2d 281 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1973); Griggs v. A.B. Chance Co., 503 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. App., K.C.
1973); Phegley v. Porter-DeWitt Constr. Co., 501 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App., Spr.
1973); State v. Obie, 501 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. App., K.C. 1973); State v. Tindall,
496 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. App., K.C. 1973); Reich v. A. Reich & Sons Gardens, Inc.,
485 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App., K.C. 1972); LeBlanc v. Webster, 483 S.W.2d 647
(Mo. App., K.C. 1972); Walker v. Massey, 417 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. App., Spr. 1967);
Dolan v. D.A. Lubricant Co., 416 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. App., K.C. 1967); Williams
v. Boone, 413 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. App., St. L. 1967); Throckmorton v. Wabash R.R.,
409.S.W.2d 260 (Mo. App., K.C. 1966); Weathers v. Falstaff BrewingCorp., 403
S.W.2d 663 (Mo. App., St. L. 1966); McClung v. White, 386 S.W.2d 678 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1964); Fennell v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 383 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. App., St.
L. 1964); State v. Hill, 373 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. App., Spr. 1963); Anthony v.Jennings, 368 S.W.2d 533 (Mo. App., K.C. 1963); Moore v. Glasgow, 366 S.W.2d
475 (Mo. App., Spr. 1963); Filger v. State Highway Comm'n, 355 S.W.2d 425
(Mo. App., K.C. 1962); Jones v. Fritz, 353 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. App., Spr. 1962);
Behm v. KingLouie's Bowl, Inc., 350 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. App., K.C. 1961); Blind
v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 349 S.W.2d 425 (Mo. App., St. L. 1961); Trantham v.
Gillioz & Snyder Constr. Co., 348 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. App., Spr. 1961); Schneiders
v. Stegeman, 344 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. App., K.C. 1961); Snider v. King, 344 S.W.2d
265 (Mo. App., Spr. 1961); Aron v. Resz, 343 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. App., K.C. 1961);
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 337 S.W.2d 566 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1960); State v. Marshall, 333 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. App., K.C. 1960);
Williams v. Kaestner, 332 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. App., St. L. 1960);Johnson v. Weston,
330 S.W.2d 160 (Mo. App., St. L. 1959); Gayer v.J.C. Penney Co., 326 S.W.2d
413 (Mo. App., St. L. 1959); Kingv. Furry, 317 S.W.2d 690 (Mo. App., St. L.
1958); Rauch v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 303 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. App., St. L.
1957); Cole v. Best Motor Lines, 303 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. App., St. L. 1957);James
v. Berry, 301 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. App., Spr. 1957); Clark v. Missouri Natural Gas
Co., 241 Mo. App. 907, 245 S.W.2d 685 (Spr.), rev'd, 251 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. En
Banc 1952); Perringer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 241 Mo. App. 521, 244
S.W.2d 607 (Spr. 1951); Christyv. Chicago, B & Q.R.R., 240 Mo. App. 632,212
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In arguments to courts, defendants 19 invoke "physical facts" to nullify
the proof on which plaintiffs must rely to survive motions for directed
verdicts.20 This is the principal use of physical facts reasoning, and the
cases and discussion related to it comprise the greater part of this Article.
It is also the use to which the unfortunate label, "physical facts rule,"
chiefly has been applied. In arguments to courts, plaintiffs21 invoke
"physical facts" both in support of their own motions for directed verdicts and in opposition to such motions by defendants. For the former
purpose, it is argued that the physical facts establish an overwhelming
23
case; 22 for the latter, that they establish, at least, a submissible case.
Both plaintiffs and defendants invoke "physical facts" in jury arguments
24
and formerly did so in jury instructions.

II. INVOKING "PHYSICAL FACTS" TO NULLIFY A PLAINTIFF'S PROOF
This proposition is fairly well settled: if a plaintiff produces even one
witness who testifies directly to each element of his case-in-chief, he has adduced proof sufficient to take his case to the jury. 25 Only the plaintiff who
S.W.2d 476 (K.C. 1948); Grace v- Union Elec. Co., 239 Mo. App. 1210, 200
S.W.2d 364 (K.C. 1947); Jordan v. Parsons, 239 Mo. App. 766, 199 S.W.2d 881
(St. L. 1947); Gaffron v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 238 Mo. App. 749, 187 S.W.2d
41 (St. L. 1945).
19. Unless otherwise required by the context, the term "defendant" encompasses all opponents of proof, including, for example, a plaintiff opposing proof propounded in support of a counterclaim or an affirmative defense.
20. Unless otherwise required by the context, the term "directed verdict" includes judgments notwithstanding the verdict.
21. Unless otherwise required by the context, the term "plaintiff" encompasses all proponents of proof, including, for example, a defendant propounding
proof in support of a counterclaim or an affirmative defense.
22. See Part III. infra.
23. See Part IV. infra.
24. For a discussion of'"physical facts" injury arguments, see Part V., infra.
MO. APPROVED INSTR. No. 1.05 (1981) now specifically prohibits the giving of a
"physical facts" jury instruction. But cf. id. No. 2.01 (jurors instructed that they
will decide facts and give testimony such weight and value as they believe it is entitled to receive). For examples of cases dealing with "physical facts"jury instructions before adoption of Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 1.05, see Myers v. Moffett,
312 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1958); Douglas v. Twenter, 364 Mo. 71, 259 S.W.2d 353
(1953); Roush v. Alkire Truck Lines, Inc., 245 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1952); Phillips v.
Vrooman, 238 S.W.2d 355 (Mo. 1951); Mavrakos v. Mavrakos Candy Co., 359
Mo. 649, 223 S.W.2d 383 (1949); Schlemmer v. McGee, 185 S.W.2d 806 (Mo.
1945); Roark v. Gunter, 404 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App., K.C. 1966); Sisk v. Driggers,
364 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. App., K.C. 1962).
25. See, e.g., Scherffius v. Orr, 442 S.W-2d 120, 124 (Mo. App., Spr. 1969);
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 338, at 790 (2d ed.

1972).
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must rely on circumstantial evidence has anything to fear from his opponent's motion for a directed verdict. 26 This is true, it is said, because even
when the judge makes every other decision in the case, credibility is still for
27
the jury to decide.
What, then, can be made of cases like Lohmann v. Wabash Railroad,28 in
which the Missouri Supreme Court held, in affirming a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant, that the testimony of the plaintiff's three witnesses was not sufficient to take an essential element of her
claim to the jury? The three witnesses, none of whom was shown to have
an interest in the outcome of the case, had testified that a movable grease
shack maintained on the defendant railroad's right-of-way by the defendant
construction company "obstructed the view to the west along the railroad
track of a person approaching the track from the north, until such person
was 'practically on the tracks.' ',29 Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the
supreme court was satisfied that it knew that the testimony of the three
witnesses did "not rise to the dignity of substantial evidence that Lohmann
could not have seen the approaching train until he was on the north rail.'"30
If the court's knowledge had attained the certitude required of judicial
notice applied to certainly established facts, its decision would have been
justified. A court need not and should not credit testimony that it judicially
knows to be false. Thus, a case relying solely on such testimony for one or
more of its elements need not and should not be submitted to a jury. For
example, the judge may reject testimony that August 1, 1981, fell on a Sunday without submitting it to the jury3' and direct a verdict against the party whose case depends on that proposition. Likewise, testimony that plaintiff's vehicle rolled uphill and collided with defendant's train may be
rejected.3 2 The second example, like the first, requires an ordinary application
of judicial notice. Courts have endowed cases of the second type with a
vocabulary of their own, however, and exalted an otherwise unremarkable
use of judicial notice to a level of conceptual autonomy, dubbing it the
"physical facts rule." 33
Even when courts have not gone this far, they have spoken of physical
facts as if they were invoking a kind of metaphysical magic. Thus, in Lohmann,
the Missouri Supreme Court said, "[W]here physical facts speak with a force
26. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, § 338, at 790.
27. See, e.g., Robinson v. St. John's Medical Center, 508 S.W.2d 7, 11 (Mo.
App., Spr. 1974); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §7.13, at 287 (2d
ed. 1977).
28. 364 Mo. 910, 269 S.W.2d 885 (1954).
29. Id. at 915, 269 S.W.2d at 889.
30. Id. at 920, 269 S.W.2d at 891-92.
31.

See MO. BAR C.L.E., SOURCES OF PROOF § 7.3 (1977).

32. Seiwell v. Hines, 273 Pa. 259, 116 A. 919 (1922).
33. See, e.g., Vaeth v. Gegg, 486 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Mo. 1972). See notes 15
& 16 and accompanying text supra.
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which overcomes testimony to the contrary, reasonable minds must accept
and follow the physical facts and therefore cannot differ.' '34 Having gone
this far, the court was "compelled to rule that the testimony of ...[plainfacts"
tiffs three witnesses] is plainly contrary to the demonstrated physical
'35
and, therefore, "cannot be accepted as substantial evidence."
Having once accepted such reasoning, it is easy, as dramatized by the
Lohmann court, to forsake the rigorous habits of thought requisite to every
proper application ofjudicial notice. Why was the court compelled to consider the testimony of the three witnesses a nullity? The court cited "the
physical facts as established by actual measurements, tests and
photographs," ' 36 probably made by the defendants, 37 with respect to a
movable obstruction.

38

The opinion does not say that the grease shack was in the same position
when the measurements and tests were made as it was when the accident
occurred. It does say that the photograph portrayed it "in the exact location it stood at the time of the occurrence, ' 39 but it does not say whether
this proposition was judicially or evidentially admitted by the plaintiff or
whether, as is more likely, the proposition was only in evidence. Clearly,
the position of the grease shack at the time of the accident was disputed in
the evidence, because the position asserted by the court was circumstantially
contradicted by the testimony of the three witnesses. The possibility that
the measurements, tests, and photographs had, at worst, been falsified or,
at best, been made too late to capture the true circumstances at the time of
the accident seems to have escaped the court, probably because the incantation of "physical facts" had already worked its magic.
Occasionally, counsel are carried away by their zeal or overwhelmed
by the intellective burden imposed by the working logic of physic4 facts.
Fowler v. Robinson40 serves as a priceless example. In fleeing an automobile
that seemed certain to crash into his tollbooth island, Fowler ran across the
highway in front of Robinson's car and was struck. Fowler had ajury verdict and judgment under the humanitarian doctrine. On appeal, Robinson
attacked the judgment on the ground that Fowler had adduced no proof that
34. 364 Mo. at 916, 269 S.W.2d at 891.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. The court did not identify the sponsorship of the photographs, but defendants typically make arguments for nullification from photographs that they have
introduced. See, e.g., Silvey v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 445 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. 1969);
Ruhl v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 304 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1957). Lohmann did put on the
civil engineer who testified to sight distances, but this testimony should not have
been held conclusive under the circumstances. See, e.g., Zumault v. Wabash R.R.,
302 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. 1957). See also Part II.C.2.b. infra.
38. 364 Mo. at 912, 269 S.W.2d at 887.
39. Id. at 915, 269 S.W.2d at 888.
40. 465 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. App., St. L. 1971).
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he was ever in a position of immediate danger, as required under the
41
humanitarian doctrine.
Robinson's counsel supported this contention as follows. On the witness
stand, Fowler had estimated the Robinson vehicle to be approaching at a
distance of 150 feet when he fled across the highway. Robinson's counsel
took this estimate, which he insisted was established in the case, 42 applied
an estimate of the vehicle's speed from Robinson's testimony, calculated
Fowler's progress across the highway at a running speed of 5.8 feet per second, and concluded that Fowler was safely across the road when Robinson's car passed. Robinson's counsel didn't phrase his conclusion that way,
of course, but it followed with some necessity from his argument. Mercifully
declining to pursue the obvious, the St. Louis Court of Appeals said merely that Fowler's testimonial estimate of distance did not establish that distance
in the case. 43 The uncontested fact that Fowler had been hit, combined properly with calculations regarding driving and running speeds, suggested that
Fowler's estimate of 150 feet was substantially mistaken, but the court correctly left that problem to the jury.
Wardin v. Quinn44 affords another example of the kind of inspired misapplication of physical facts reasoning to which litigants are occasionally tempted. Mrs. Wardin prosecuted a claim for nursing services against the estate
of an aunt-in-law. Her expert witnesses who testified to the value of her services themselves operated a nursing home. Because they testified to a value
higher than they were charging in their own nursing home, the executor
argued that their testimony was "opposed to the physical facts, and.., not
... substantial evidence.' '45 In affirming ajudgment for Mrs.Wardin, the
Kansas City Court of Appeals displayed a certain flair for understatement
when it said, "This contention is not sound.' '46 The issue was value, an
abstraction far removed from the concrete world of physical facts. There
are, regrettably, not a few reported Missouri decisions in which the invocation
of physical facts reasoning was, at best, marginal. 47

41. Id. at 8.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 8-10.
44. 324 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. App., K.C. 1959).
45. Id. at 154.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Rollins v. Postlewait, 358 S.W.2d 828 (Mo. 1962); Counts v.
Kansas City S.R.R., 340 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1960); Martin v. Kansas City, 340
S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1960); State v. McMillian, 338 S.W.2d 838 (Mo. 1960); Page
v. Hamilton, 329 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1959); Pender v. Foeste, 329 S.W.2d 656 (Mo.
1959); Garrison v. Ryno, 328 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1959); Rosenfeld v. Peters, 327
S.W.2d 264 (Mo. 1959); Waldrip v. American Buslines, Inc., 327 S.W.2d 211 (Mo.
1959); State v. Baugh, 323 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. En Banc 1959); Johnson v. Presley,
320 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1959); Fenneren v. Smith, 316 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1958); State
v. Moss, 316 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1958); Loveless v. Locke Distrib. Co., 313 S.W.2d
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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Premisesand Black Letter Propositions

After stating in the original New Mexico study that "[t]he 'physical facts
rule' is not a rule at all, but merely an entanglement of two distinguishable
and equally unremarkable applications of the law of judicial notice, '48 I
undertook nonetheless to restate it as a rule, 49 because of a belief that the
profession could not be persuaded "to remove [it] from the working terminology of trial and appellate practice.' '50 Only forty-seven appellate opin51
ions in thirteen states, however, have spoken of a "physical facts rule."
Thus, it might still be possible to eliminate both the term and the careless
analysis it exemplifies. Before examining the Missouri cases in which
"physical facts" are invoked to nullify otherwise sufficient evidence, the
premises and black letter propositions advanced a decade ago concerning
the probative force of physical facts should be reconsidered.

24 (Mo. 1958); Anderson v. Bell, 303 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. 1957); Teters v. Kansas
City Pub. Serv. Co., 300 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. 1957); Parker v. Ford Motor Co., 296
S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1956); Wagner v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 275 S.W.2d 262
(Mo. 1955); Reimers v. Frank B. Connet Lumber Co., 271 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. 1954);
Largo v. Bonadonna, 269 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1954); Hayes v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 365 Mo. 832, 269 S.W.2d 639 (1954); McCrary v. Ogden, 267 S.W.2d 670
(Mo. 1954); Lansford v. Southwest Lime Co., 266 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. 1954); Larson v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 364 Mo. 344, 261 S.W.2d 111 (1953); Duffy v.
Rohan, 259 S.W.2d 839 (Mo. 1953); Romandel v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co.,
364 Mo. 442, 254 S.W.2d 585 (1953); Enyart v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 363
Mo. 346, 241 S.W.2d 268 (1951); Thompson v. Byers Transp. Co., 362 Mo. 42,
239 S.W.2d 498 (1951); Clark v. McKeone, 234 S.W.2d 574 (Mo. 1950); Harrow
v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 361 Mo. 42, 233 S.W.2d 644 (1950); Piehler v.
Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 360 Mo. 12, 226 S.W.2d 681 (1950); Pearson v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 359 Mo. 1185, 225 S.W.2d 742 (En Banc 1950); Steffen
v. Ritter, 360 Mo. 358, 214 S.W.2d 28 (1948); Cooper v. Kansas City Pub. Serv.
Co., 356 Mo. 482, 202 S.W.2d 42 (En Banc 1947); Golden v. National Utils., 356
Mo. 84, 201 S.W.2d 292 (1947); Lowry v. Mohn, 357 Mo. 665, 195 S.W.2d 652
(1946); Shelton v. Thompson, 353 Mo. 964, 185 S.W.2d 777 (1945); Anderson
v. Sellers, 521 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975); State v. Burnett, 520 S.W.2d
148 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975); State v. Davis, 504 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. App., K.C.
1973); State v. Maxwell, 502 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. App., St. L. 1973); Fowlerv. Robinson, 465 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. App., St. L. 1971); Yeager v. Buffington, 450 S.W.2d
464 (Mo. App., K.C. 1970); Stepp v. Rainwater, 373 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. App., K.C.
1963); Wood v.Ezell, 342 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. App., Spr. 1961); LeNeve v.Rankin,
341 S.W.2d 358 (Mo. App., K.C. 1960); Cole v. Best Motor Lines, 303 S.W.2d
170 (Mo. App., St. L. 1957); Gurwell v.Jefferson City Lines, 239 Mo. App. 1005,
192 S.W.2d 683 (K.C. 1946).
48. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 54.
49. Id. at 55-56.
50. Id. at 55.
51. Search of all appropriate state libraries of the Lexis @computer research
service conducted on May 17, 1982.
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The first premise is that the physical facts rule does not embody an independent or discrete legal principle, but is merely a jumble of catchily
characterized manifestations of the law ofjudicial notice. Ideally, the term
will appear, if at all, in only one more opinion of the Missouri Supreme
Court-the opinion which declares that there is no such thing as a physical
2
5

facts rule.

Second, the phrase "physical facts" embodies no independent or discrete
legal principle and has no special legal or logical significance. If relevant
"facts" truly are undisputed, it makes no uniformly operating logical difference whether they are "physical" or not. Any fact that is truly undisputed
and about which a court may judicially notice some attribute or function
can be applied to nullify contrary testimony that would otherwise constitute
sufficient evidence. Such facts are often types easily characterized as "physical
facts." Unfortunately, this characterization occasionally makes a
psychological difference of fatal significance to the party opposing a motion
for a directed verdict. "Rarely is the thing which we refer to as a 'physical
fact' itself actually in court. It is there by description only: description by
5
oral testimony, description by diagram, description by photograph, etc."s
And yet, "[o]nce the magic words are invoked, it often happens that no one
(including the party who invoked the words) is further able to perceive that
54
there is not a 'physical fact' to be seen in the courtroom.'
There are also two blackletter propositions to be restated. First is the
proposition appropriate to what will be termed the "attribute cases."
Testimony in these cases is a nullity when it asserts that a thing or being
of established identity in the case has an attribute that it is judicially known
not to have.5 5 Second is the proposition appropriate to what will be called
the "function cases." Testimony in these cases is a nullity when it asserts
a proposition of fact contradictory to that required by the application of a
judicially known relational principle (the function) to another proposition
56
of fact established in the case.

The logic in attribute and function cases is vulnerable to error at two
points. If the court accepts as established in the case some proposition of
fact that could itself have been rejected by a properly functioning jury, e.g.,
the defendants' photograph in Lohmann, or if the court acknowledges an attribute or applies a function not a proper subject ofjudicial notice, the losing party has been deprived of his constitutional right to a jury
determination. 5

7

52. The court has already said as much in one special context. See Ruhl v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 304 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Mo. 1957); Part II.C.2.b. infra.
53. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 53.
54. Id. at 69-70.
55. See Part II.B. infra.
56. See Part II.C. infra.
57. MO. CONST. art. 1, § 22(a); id. art. 11, § 4.
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A proposition of fact is not "established," as the term is used throughout
this Article, until a jury has found it to be true or unless a jury must, by
judicial fiat, accept it as true. In attribute cases, the identity of a thing is
established in the case by judicial fiat if it has been judicially noticed, 58 has
been judicially admitted, is undisputed in the evidence, or is made so certain by the evidence that the court could legally direct a verdict on the issue
of its identity. In function cases, the proposition of fact properly may be
established in the case by judicial fiat only if it has been judicially noticed
or judicially admitted.
B.

Attribute Cases-The "Physical Facts" Syllogism

Testimony in the attribute cases is a nullity when it asserts, either directly
or indirectly, that a thing or being of established identity in the case has an
attribute that it is judicially known not to have. This section will examine
cases illustrating physical facts reasoning applied to attributes of things and
to attributes of beings, particularly human beings, give special attention to
State v. Duncan,59 a theory-testing case par excellence, and consider briefly
the attribute of reaction time and its place in the scheme.
1. Attributes of Things
Seiwell v. Hines,60 a Pennsylvania case, affords an example that recurs
in the judicial lore. In attempting to explain why his automobile had been
struck by the defendant's passing train, Seiwell testified that "the suction
of the moving train drew the automobile against the locomotive.' '61 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that no such capability could be attributed
to a moving train. Relying on an exposition of common knowledge rather
than on a demonstration of scientific principles of physics, the court observed
that" [e]very day trains at high speed pass stations with baggage trucks and
other objects standing on the platforms, in close proximity to the tracks, and
they are not disturbed by the moving train.'"62 The court concluded, "It
is inconceivable that any such thing could have occurred, as such a happenstance is opposed to all natural laws and common experience.' '63 The
defendant's train was the thing the identity of which was established in the
case without contradiction. Seiwell's case depended on the proposition that
what had struck him was the defendant's train, and the defendant did not
contest that proposition directly or circumstantially.
58. This alternative is included to hold open the theoretical possibility that
the minor premise of the physical facts syllogism might be established by judicial
notice.
59. 540 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
60. 273 Pa. 259, 116 A. 919 (1922).
61. Id. at 260, 116 A. at 919.
62. Id. at 260-61, 116 A. at 919.
63. Id. at 260, 116 A. at 919.
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Cameron v. Goree,64 an Oregon case, is equally dramatic. In that case,
Cameron had a jury verdict and judgment on testimony that tended by
necessary inference to show thatjust before the accident, Goree's car, a 1941
Chdvrolet, was travelling at a speed of 204 to 318 miles per hour. The Oregon
Supreme Court reversed, stating, "We think that people of average intelligence know that automobiles such as the one which the appellant drove
cannot travel 200 miles per hour." 65 The .testimony was nullified because
it attributed to the 1941 Chevrolet, a thing of established identity in the case,
a capability that it was judicially known to lack. The identity of Goree's vehicle can properly be regarded as established in the case because there is no
suggestion in the report that it was ever in dispute and it is the kind of fact
66
that the parties to the usual case would concede.
The Missouri reports contain a precedent very similar to Cameron. In
Ewen v. Spence, 67 Ewen, whose tractor and combine had been struck when
he turned left across a highway in front of Spence's oncoming automobile,
sued Spence under the humanitarian doctrine. Spence testified that he was
only fifty to seventy-five feet from the intersection when Ewen turned in front
of him. Ewen testified that Spence was about one-fourth of a mile away when
Ewen turned. Employing Ewen's other testimony about the width of the
highway and the speed of the tractor, the Springfield Court of Appeals
calculated that Spence's car "would have to have been proceeding at the
rate of about, less than, three hundredmiles per hour, and this does not take
into account the effect of braking for at least one hundred and six feet.' '68
The court reversed a judgment for Ewen and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion.
Read as a physical facts opinion, Ewen can be faulted for its inattention
to the requirement that a subsidiary proposition of fact on which nullification reasoning is to be based must be established in the case. The identity
of Spence's vehicle was established; its identity was not contested. In order
to nullify Ewen's testimony about distance, however, the court arguably took
Ewen's testimony about the speed of his tractor as established in the case,
even while acknowledging the general teaching of numerous authorities that
"plaintiff is not to be too strictly bound or judged by exact figures as to time,
speed, or distance, when such is a matter of estimate."

69

To believe Ewen's

testimonial estimate about speed in order to nullify his inconsistent
testimonial estimate about distance smacks of arbitrary selectivity.
Perhaps Ewen is most usefully viewed as combining the "physical facts"
reasoning of an attribute case with the "inconsistent statements" reason64.

182 Or. 581, 189 P.2d 596 (1948).

65.

Id. at 599, 189 P.2d at 603.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Hoffman, supra note 1, at 58.
405 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. App., Spr. 1966).
Id. at 523.
Id. at 524.
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ing of anofher line of cases. 70 The court's judicial knowledge that a speed
of 300 miles per hour could not be attributed to Spence's car spotlighted an
inconsistency in Ewen's testimony so irreconcilable that it indicated "a lack
of knowledge in respect to the facts testified to"71 and required the conclusion that none of his testimony was "probative evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict.' '72 Every argument about inconsistent statements might
best be left to the jury, but that broad question is beyond the scope of this
Article. Perhaps the court properly excepted physically irreconcilable
statements in the context of an attribute case from a general rule committing the resolution of testimonial inconsistencies to the jury.
2. Attributes of Beings
Kiburz v. Loc- Wood Boat &Motors73 is an attribute case in which the be-

ing established in the case was a human actor and the attribute was the
capability to do a certain act or to accomplish a certain result. Kiburz, who
had fallen off his water skis, was run over and killed by Loc-Wood's large
excursion boat, the Tuscumbia. His administrator sued for wrongful death,
alleging that Loc-Wood's pilot had failed to maintain a proper lookout. An
eyewitness testified that "inan effort to attract attention and avoid being
struck by the Tuscumbia, Kiburz was treading water with his skis on 74and
with the upper half of his body from the waist up out of the water."
Although, as the Missouri Supreme Court noted, there was other
substantial evidence to support the administrator's theory, 75 Loc-Wood's
attorney focused on this testimony, arguing that it was "inherently incredible
and should have been stricken and disregarded under the incontrovertible
physical facts rule ' 76 and that it "ascribed to Kiburz 'super-natural
power.' "77 The court declined Loc-Wood's invitation to judicially notice
the line between natural attribute and supernatural power, stating that the
evidence was otherwise sufficient and that "[t]he testimony attacked...
[was] not essential in any respect to the making of a submissible case for the
plaintiff, but would go only to the credibility . . . [of the witness's]
78
testimony."
Anderson v. Orscheln Brothers Trucklines, Inc. ,79 a case factually similar to

Kiburz, is an attribute case but not strictly a physical facts case, even though
70.
1971).
71.
72.

See generally Fowler v. Robinson, 465 S.W.2d 5, 8-9 (Mo. App., St. L.
405 S.W.2d at 525.
Id.

73.

356 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1962).

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 888.
Id. at 889.
Id. at 888.
Id. at 889.
Id.
393 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1965).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/1

18

1982]

Hoffman: Hoffman: Probative Force of Physical Facts in Missouri Jurisprudence

"'PHYSICAL FACTS" IN MISSOURI

387

the physical facts rule was invoked, because judicial notice was not invoked
to nullify the testimony under attack. Instead, the defendant adduced the
testimony of seven witnesses to show that it was physically impossible for
Anderson to have vaulted up onto a loading platform in the manner in which
he had testified. Each of the seven testified that he had tried it and failed.
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on a jury verdict for
the plaintiff, saying, "The seven witnesses did not establish physical impossibility as a matter of law. The jury was privileged to disbelieve their
testimony. The 'physical facts' rule has no application where the credibility of witnesses is involved." 80 Had Anderson's testimony implied that he
had flown up to the loading platform, the court might have nullified it by
an appropriate application of judicial notice. Because he actually testified
only to some reasonably athletic clambering, 8 ' the court properly declined
2
to notice that he could not do it, even if it were proved that others could not.
3.

State v. Duncan

State v. Duncan8 3 is a precedent on the frontier between attribute cases
and function cases. It carries physical facts reasoning beyond the reach of
the five senses into a probative environment of facts available to human cognition only with the aid of science. Beyond that, it affords an instructive opportunity to observe physical facts reasoning in the substantive environment
of criminal litigation, a prosecution and conviction of second degree murder.
Duncan appealed his second degree murder conviction for the shotgun
slaying of a victim otherwise unidentified in the decision. Davenport testified"
that Duncan, who was carrying a shotgun and was accompanied by Hemphill, had run from her house into the street and had fired two shots at the
window of a parked car. She "stated unequivocally. that Hemphill did not
have the shotgun. "84 Her testimony was buttressed by the testimony of an
expert witness, who testified, by way of expert inference from computer data

80. Id. at 460.
81. Id. at 455-56.
82. In Ogden v. Toth, 542 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976), defendant
Toth argued that his pulling on a rope attached to a partially severed treetop could
not proximately have caused the treetop to fall on and injure plaintiff Ogden because
"it was physically impossible for one man to pull down the upper portion of this
tree when [according to undisputed testimony] four men could not budge it earlier."
Id. at 21. The St. Louis Court of Appeals held the evidence of proximate cause sufficient, however, saying, "[T]here was testimony showing that the trunk had been
loosened by cutting it at the base, and this explains why it was possible for one man
to pull it down then when four men could not do so earlier." Id. The court did not
suggest the result would have been otherwise had intervening events not afforded
this explanation.
83. 540 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
84. Id. at 133.
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derived from a gunshot residue test, that Duncan probably had recently
5
handled or discharged a firearm.
Duncan's attorney sought to turn the gunshot residue evidence to his
client's advantage. The St. Louis Court of Appeals remarked on the "novel
posture" of Duncan's contention, observing that" [t]ypically, a defendant
asserts that positive results in his own gunshot residue tests are inadmissible
because NAA [neutron activation analysis] lacks reliability." ' 86 Here,
however, Hemphill's gunshot residue test had also been positive, and Duncan's attorney argued "that NAA results are not only admissible but so conclusive that positive results on both defendant and another person will negate
eyewitness testimony that defendant alone fired the gun. "87 Thus confronted
by "the so-called 'physical facts' rule," 88 the court perceived two questions:
"First, is NAA an incontrovertible fact? Second, does it directly contradict
89
the eyewitness testimony?'

The court used its answer to the second question as an escape and never
came satisfactorily to grips with the first. The court held that "the 'fact' that
Hemphill had handled and/or discharged a gun within the previous several
days does not directly contradict Ms. Davenport's testimony that defendant
alone fired two shots at the victim and that Hemphill did not have a shotgun
at that time. "9 When the expert testified that "within a reasonable degree
of scientific certainty this person (Hemphill) had recently handled and
discharged a firearm," 91 he "defined 'recently' as ranging from immediately
to several days.'"92 Thus," [t]he probability that he had 'recently' discharged
a firearm may indicate only that he fired a weapon at some earlier time ....
85.
86.

Id. at 134.
Id. Neutron activation analysis uses a high neutron flux nuclear reactor

to determine the presence of antimony and barium in discharge residue taken from

a suspect's hands. The residue sample is placed in the reactor and bombarded with
neutrons, causing the chemical elements in the sample to become radioactive. While
radioactive, the characteristics of each element except lead are distinct and identifiable. Homicide investigators maintain that neutron activation analysis is not conclusive and, further, that no conclusive gunshot residue test is available. Gunpowder
is not the only source of antimony and barium compounds; positive reaction to
neutron activation analysis can be expected for any person who has handled such
compounds, regardless of their source. Conversely, the test has, on occasion, shown
negative results for subjects known to have fired weapons. T. COOKE, CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 24-30 (1970); interviews by MelindaJoy Howes with
Captain Shirley Fields and Homicide Investigator Wayne Murphy of the Tuscaloosa
City Police Department.
87. 540 S.W.2d at 134.

88. Id.
89.

Id. at 135.

90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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[T]he 'physical facts' rule could not have been invoked by this court to
disregard Ms. Davenport's testimony."93

Because the court found no contradiction, its response to the question
of the incontrovertibility vel non of NAA is dictum. The court concluded,
"Assuming without deciding that the expert's testimony was not impeached, NAA results could have come within the rule as 'facts' established by
physics." 94 This simple statement evokes many differentiable though interwoven responses, which will be examined as if they were discrete.
a. Duncan as a Borderline Attribute Case
To eliminate the question of contradiction vel non, Davenport's
testimony will be modified to testimony simply that Hemphill had not
discharged a firearm. Her assertion can be tested by a syllogism 95 incorporating as its major premise the following generalization: a person who has
recently discharged a firearm will have about his person certain concentrations of barium and antimony residues. An essential element of attribute
cases is a thing or being of established identity in the case. In Duncan, the
being was a member of a restrictively defined category of persons, i.e., those
bearing certain concentrations of barium and antimony residues on their
hair, skin, and clothing. That Hemphill was a member of the category could
be taken as established in the case, because the prosecution asserted that he
was and Duncan adopted the assertion.
What of relevance can be attributed to a person within the category?
Here, it is not a capacity or incapacity to be attributed; it is certain past conduct. A person in this category, according to the proffered reasoning, will
have recently discharged a firearm. If that proposition can be judicially
noticed, it will support proof-nullifying physical facts reasoning as follows:
Hemphill was a person in this category; therefore, he had recently discharged
a firearm. Because Davenport's testimony contradicted this conclusion, it
must be nullified as contrary to physical facts. Thus viewed, Duncan appears
to be a subtle attribute case, subtle at least in part because the physical facts
essential to the reasoning process are beyond the reach of the senses.
b. Duncan as a Borderline Function Case
A later section will examine the forensic reconstruction of accidents from
established propositions of subsequent fact. 96 The reasoning there will follow
not the pattern of the syllogism, as illustrated in the previous section, but
the pattern of question and hypothesis: What combination of antecedent positions and forces could have produced the results found at this accident scene?
Duncan can be approached in this way. What will explain the traces of barium
93.
94.

Id.
Id. (dictum).

95.

See Hoffman, supra note 1, at 56-57.

96.

See Part II.C. infra.
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and antimony residues found on Hemphill's person? Accidents are a subset
of a larger category known collectively as incidents. An accident is an incident characterized by a certain perceived intention. Thus, just as a highway
intersection can be examined as an accident scene, so the external surfaces
of Hemphill's person, hair, skin, and clothing can be examined as an incident scene.
If all accident scenes were identical, a generalization could eventually
be drawn about antecedent positions and forces. Each accident scene,
however, is unique. Many present confusingly complicated pictures with
many relevant and, sometimes, apparently contra-indicative features. Thus,
there can be no generalization from a class of previous "identical" accidents
to the one in litigation. Instead, nonunique features, features that have recurred with sufficient frequency to support generalizations, are identified. The
fragmentary generalizations appropriate to these features are combined to
explain the concurrence of features that comprise the scene. Where a selection among generalizations and/or a recombination of fragmentary
generalizations is required, an inference is drawn. Thus, generalization and
inference are seen not as discrete collateral mental processes, but as simple
and compound forms, respectively, of the same process.
In Duncan, the simple form suffices. The external surfaces of Hemphill's
person comprise, according to this analysis, a simple incident scene, the only
relevant feature of which is the presence of certain concentrations of barium
and antimony residues. A recurrent, single-feature incident scene resembles
a thing or being of established identity and classification in at least one
respect: comprehensive generalizations can be made about both. And yet,
because of the tendency to distinguish things from occurrences, the simple'
incident scene will seem more closely related to complicated incident scenes,
about which comprehensive generalization is not possible, than to things
and beings. Small wonder that the distinction between attribute and function blurs at the border.
c. Duncan as Bringing Microphenomena Within "Physical Facts" Reasoning
The court in Duncan said that "NAA results could have come within the
[physical facts] rule as 'facts' established by physics." ' 97 This statement
presents, for the first time, the novel and particularized proposition that
"physical facts" means "facts established by physics" or, at least, that "facts
established by physics" comprise a subcategory of "physical facts." This
proposition is apparently tailored to accommodate microphenomena, i.e.,
physical facts the presence or occurrence of which cannot be perceived by
the senses, but which can only be inferred from other physical facts that are
so perceptible. The likelihood that Hemphill had "recently handled or
discharged a firearm" 9 8 depended on "the levels of barium and antimony
97.
98.

540 S.W.2d at 135.
Id.
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in the [gunshot residue] sample,' 99 but the five senses cannot perceive levels
of barium and antimony or even that barium and antimony are present at
all. 10 Thus, even at this first step, the jury had to rely on the science of physics
as interpreted by an expert witness to report the presence of phenomena that
were imperceptible to the senses and to reason from those "physical facts"
to the conclusion that certain concentrations of barium and antimony residues
were present in the test sample. This Missouri precedent carries physical
facts reasoning beyond the senses into an environment of "facts" humanly
cognizable only with the aid of science.
d. Duncan as a Case in Which Judicial Notice Was Not Justified
The court in Duncan said that the results of neutron activation analysis
might" come within the rule as 'facts' established by physics." 101 In what
sense could this be so? For the purpose of this discussion, Duncan will be
treated as an attribute case. Testimony is a nullity in an attribute case when
it asserts, either directly or indirectly, that a thing or being of established
identity in the case has an attribute that it is judicially known not to have,
or, conversely, as in Duncan, does not have an attribute that it is known to
have. A proposition of fact is not "established" until ajury has found it to
be true or unless ajury must, by judicial fiat, accept it as true. To come within
the "rule" that testimony is nullified by contradictory physical facts, some
proposition in the chain of circumstantial reasoning must be judicially
noticeable.
Where is the judicially noticeable proposition in Duncan? The identity
of Hemphill as a member of the class of persons bearing certain concentrations of barium and antimony residues could not be judicially noticed. His
membership in that special subclass of human beings had to be established
by admission or by overwhelming proof. No principle of physics assures,
for example, that a Hemphill always comes accompanied by traces of
chemicals not found about the persons of people generally. That Hemphill's
identity as a class member could not be judicially noticed did not, however,
preclude valid physical facts reasoning. His identity was the minor premise
of the attribute syllogism, and that premise, according to the terms of the
formula, need only be established by admission or overwhelming proof. Duncan admitted it by adopting it as a premise of his own attack on Davenport's
testimony.
According to the terms of the formula, the major premise of the attribute
syllogism must be judicially noticeable. In Duncan, the major premise that
any member of the class described will recently have discharged a firearm
was not judicially noticeable. No such generalization lies within the ex99. Id.
100. A witness might, conceivably, smell gunshot residue on a subject, or more
precisely, smell an odor like that recalled from a former occasion on which a firearm
was discharged.
101. 540 S.W.2d at 135.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982

23

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 1

392

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

perience of eitherjury or judge. A court may judicially notice propositions
of scientific fact about which there is no legitimate disagreement among scientists of requisite expertise, but it may not judicially notice that a certain relationship always exists when scientists themselves are not certain that it does.
This uncertainty seemed present in Duncan, wherein "the expert witness
testified,'... within a reasonabledegree of scientific certainty this person (Hemphill) had recently handled and discharged a firearm.' "102 A jury might
well be persuaded that a reasonable degree of scientific certainty is certainty
enough for it. Likewise, the parties might be persuaded to admit the relationship. In either case, the fact would, in some sense, have been established
by physics, but not in the special sense required by the logic of physical facts
reasoning.
4. Reaction Time
When no quicker or slower reaction time is asserted, a court will attribute
to a human actor a reaction time of three-fourths second. 1 0 3 This attribution is not typically invoked to nullify testimonial assertions about reaction
time, but rather to fill an incidental testimonial gap. Thus, reaction time
is an attribute that does not figure typically in attribute cases, but rather
in function cases, in which it serves as a fragmentary generalization in the
reconstruction of accidents.1 0 4 If pressed, however, a court might nullify
testimony asserting a reaction time that deviated too extremely from the
judicially noticeable three-fourths of a second.

C. Function Cases- The "Physical Facts" Equation
Testimony is a nullity in a function case when it asserts a proposition
of fact contradicting that required by the application of a judicially known
relational principle to another proposition of fact established in the case. This
established proposition of fact becomes the given term in an equation of which
the relational principle is the function. If the equation's solution, the proposition of fact required by the application of the judicially known relational
principle, contradicts the testimony being tested, the testimony is nullified.
The physical facts equation is invoked principally in forensic reconstruc105
tions of incidents or in forensic determinations of visibility.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. See, e.g., Vaeth v. Gegg, 486 S.W.2d 625, 627-28 (Mo. 1972); Osborn
v. McBride, 400 S.W.2d 185, 189 (Mo. 1966); Hickerson v. Portner, 325 S.W.2d
783, 786 (Mo. 1959); Allen v. Hayen, 320 S.W.2d 441, 449 (Mo. 1959); Davis v.
St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 316 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Mo. 1958); Wiseman v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 575 S.W.2d 742, 749 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); Fowler v. Robinson,
465 S.W.2d 5, 10 (Mo. App., St. L. 1971); Shelton v. Bruner, 449 S.W.2d 673,
677 n.4 (Mo. App., Spr. 1969); Johnson v. Weston, 330 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1959).
104. See Part II.C.l.a. infra.
105. Determinations of visibility figure largely in reconstructions of certain
kinds of accidents, but they implicate analytical problems of sufficient distinctiveness
to justify separate and coordinate treatment. See Part II.C.2. infra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/1
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1. Forensic Reconstruction of Incidents

Most cases of this kind concern the reconstruction of vehicular accidents
from propositions about the location, extensity, and intensity of skidmarks
and gouges; the location, nature, and severity of damage to vehicles; the
postaccident positions of vehicles; the location, kind, and quantity of impact debris; and speeds and distances. The miscellaneous cases filling out
the category include prosecutions for violent crimes.
a. Reconstruction of Vehicular Accidents
Propositions about skidmarks, damage, postaccident positions, debris,
speeds, and distances are, if established to the requisite certainty, the given
terms or, in composite, the given term of the physical fact's equation. They
cannot themselves be judicially noticed; nothing requires their presence in
any certain configuration at any particular accident scene. Thus, they must
be established by judicial admissions or by overwhelming proof. In some
kinds of cases, failure to establish the given term is the typical reason for
a court's refusal to nullify testimony contradicting the equation's solution
for the unknown term. The unknown term of the equation is the reconstruction of positions and forces, in whole or in part, existing at the instant before
the accident. The unknown term cannot be supplied without the requisite
certainty of both the given term and the function.
Stated in its simplest theoretical form, the function is a generalization
about the relationship between sequential states of affairs, i.e., between the
given and unknown terms of the physical facts equation. In practical application to the reconstruction of accidents, particularly vehicular accidents,
in which "frequently ...unlooked-for results attend the meeting of interacting forces,' ' 0 6 the function is a combination of noncomprehensive
generalizations about the relationship between the circumstances found at
the scene and the pre-accident positions and forces that could produce those
circumstances. When this combination is accomplished by common sense,
nonmathematical reasoning, it is said that an inference has been drawn.
Thus, for the purpose of practical forensics, the function is an inference about
the relationship between the given and unknown terms of the physical facts
equation.
Courts typically call the function a "principle of science,' 1 0 7 a "law of
nature," 10 8 a matter of "common knowledge," 10 9 or some variation 0 or
106. Steffen v. Ritter, 214 S.W.2d 28, 29 (Mo. 1948); Lowry v. Mohn, 195
S.W.2d 652, 657 (Mo. 1946); Phillips v. Stockman, 351 S.W.2d 464, 470 (Mo.
App., Spr. 1961).
107. See, e.g., Kelly v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 315 S.W.2d 699, 702 (Mo. 1958).
108. See, e.g., Caffeyv. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 292 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Mo. App.,
Spr. 1956).
109. See, e.g., Gilpin v. Gerbes Supermarket, Inc., 446 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Mo.
En Banc 1969); Lohmann v. Wabash R.R., 364 Mo. 910, 919, 269 S.W.2d 885,
891 (1954).
110. See, e.g., Statev. Cooksey, 499 S.W.2d485, 488 (Mo. 1973)("inconsisPublished
by University
of Missouri
of Law Scholarship
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Inc., 446
Gerbes Supermarket,
Gilpin v.Repository,
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mankind");
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combiriation'1 of these. When the reasoning process is a matter of common
sense, courts are likely to invoke "common knowledge" to justify judicial
notice of the function. As the reasoning process tends toward scientific precision, courts are likely to invoke "laws of nature" or "principles of science"
to justify judicial notice of the function.
In some kinds of cases, courts accept the given term of the physical facts
equation as established in the case, but refuse to nullify testimony contradicting the equation's solution, the unknown term, because judicial notice of
the function cannot be justified. This is more likely to happen in cases in
which judicial examination of the interacting forces reveals too many contributory variables to be integrated by common knowledge, yet too few to
support a certain conclusion built on scientific principles.
i. Accident Cases in Which a Plaintiff's Proof Was Nullified
by the "Physical Facts" Equation
Courts generally will not reconstruct accidents as a matter of law. The
Missouri Supreme Court and the Springfield Court of Appeals have both
said, " 'So frequently do unlooked-for results attend the meeting of interacting forces that courts should not indulge in arbitrary deductions from
physical law and fact except when they appear to be so clear and irrefutable
that no room is left for the entertainment, by reasonable minds, of any
other.' 112 Deductions seldom appear so clear and irrefutable that they
justify judicial notice, but in a few Missouri cases, some of debatable wisdom,
a plaintiff's proof has been nullified by application of the physical facts
equation.
A proposition of fact regarding the location of damage to a vehicle has
been successfully invoked to nullify testimony asserting certain relative orientations of vehicles at impact. In Neil v. Mayer," 3 the St. Louis Court of Appeals reversed a verdict and judgment for Neil, because the case had been
submitted erroneously under the "rear end collision doctrine." 4 There was
no substantial evidence, in the court's view, that Neil's taxicab had been
struck in the rear by Mayer's automobile. Neil testified that his cab had been
struck" from the back"" 5 and "from the rear,""16 but taking his testimony
S.W.2d 615, 618 (Mo. En Banc 1969) ("established physical facts or laws"); State
v. Duncan, 540 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976) ("unquestioned laws
of nature").
111. See, e.g., Gilpin v. Gerbes Supermarket, Inc., 446 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Mo.
En Banc 1969); State v. Duncan, 540 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
112. Steffen v. Ritter, 214 S.W.2d 28, 29 (Mo. 1948); Lowry v. Mohn, 195
S.W.2d 652, 657 (Mo. 1946); Phillips v. Stockman, 351 S.W.2d 464, 470 (Mo.
App., Spr. 1961).
113. 426 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. App., St. L. 1968).
114. Id. at 716.
115. Id. at 715.
116. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/1
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as a whole, he might have meant only that the cab was struck from a position out of his vision behind him.
As its first stated ground for nullifying this testimony, the court said that
"a witness may qualify his testimony in such a way as to render it of no probative value. "117 Also, photographs, "introduced by both plaintiff and
defendant" 11 8 and identified by a plaintiff's witness, 119 "showed damage
120
to the side of the left rear fender back of the left rear wheel of the taxicab,"
but none to the rear end. As an additional ground for nullifying Neil's
testimony, the court said that it was "entirely inconsistent with the undisputed photographic evidence that there was no physical damage to the
'121
rear end of the taxicab but only to the left side near the rear.
If the photographic evidence was truly undisputed, the proposition about
location of damage portrayed by the photographs was properly deemed
established in the case. Assuming away the court's first ground of decision,
however, the photographs were indirectly disputed by Neil's testimony that
Mayer's car had struck his cab from the rear. 122 Indirect contradiction should
suffice: A rule requiring direct contradiction too often would trap the unwary into sacrifices of their right to jury determination. A jury may choose
the photographs over inconsistent oral testimony, but the court should not
do so as a matter of law. Thus, the decision in Neil arguably was mistaken,
unless Neil had admitted directly that the photographs portrayed accurately
the location of the damage to his cab, while continuing to assert a kind of
collision inconsistent with such damage. That, apparently, was the court's
view, which leads back to the first of its alternative grounds and diminishes
considerably the decision's value as a physical facts precedent.
Propositions of fact regarding the extent of damage to one vehicle and
the postcollision position of the other have been successfully invoked to nullify
expert testimony that an automobile was travelling less than twenty miles
per hour at impact. In East v. McMenamy, 123 the eastbound car that East's
decedent was driving struck McMenamy's eastbound truck from the rear
as the truck was making a left turn. According to the investigating highway
patrolman, the collision occurred in the north or westbound lane of the
highway. 124 It was apparently not disputed that "the truck was knocked over
on its side and found on the north shoulder of the highway headed west, and
the automobile the deceased was driving was demolished with parts of the
engine and dashboard found in the rear part of the automobile."1

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 716.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 714.
Id.
Id. at 716.
Id. at 715.
266 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1954).
Id. at, 730.
Id. at 731.
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almost certainly, under these facts, with a defense of contributory negligence
against a primary negligence submission, East's counsel submitted the case
under the humanitarian doctrine. The trial court directed a verdict for
McMenamy at the close of East's case.
Apparently unwilling to hold that the humanitarian doctrine could not
apply at all under these circumstances, the Missouri Supreme Court held
instead that East had adduced no evidence from which it could be found that
"there was any time for the respondent, with the means at hand, to avert
the impending accident.' '126 East's expert witness had testified that the car
took 2.85 seconds to lay down the sixty-five-foot skidmarks reported by the
investigating patrolman, but this necessitated the conclusion, which the expert apparently stated, that the car was going no more than 15.9 miles per
hour when it struck the truck. 127 Referring to the postcollision position of
the truck and condition of the car, the court nullified this expert testimony
as "contrary to physical facts and in conflict with common observations and
experiences of men."

128

Although the supreme court agreed with the trial

judge that no submissible case of humanitarian negligence had been made,
it reversed and remanded "so appellant [East] may plead specific negligence,
if she is so advised." 129 East probably was not so advised. The postcollision
condition of the car and position of the truck are propositions of a kind often
conceded without dispute. If they were so conceded here, East was correctly
decided, notwithstanding the indirect contradiction afforded by the expert's
testimony.
Propositions of fact regarding speeds and distances have been invoked
successfully to nullify a plaintiff's testimony that a train was a certain distance
from a crossing at a certain time. In Marshall v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Railway, 3 0 the Missouri Supreme Court held that the trial court had properly entered judgment for the railroad notwithstanding the verdict for Marshall, because there was "no substantial evidence that plaintiff's imminent
and inescapable peril (after the loss of control of his automobile) was
discovered or discoverable by defendant in the exercise of ordinary care in
time for it to have thereafter avoided the collision by stopping or slackening the speed of the train."'13 Taking other speeds and distances testified
to by Marshall as established in the case, the court demonstrated by simple
mathematical calculations that the train could not have been as far from the
crossing when Marshall first saw it as he had testified. Marshall "would not
have been able to see the front end of an approaching train until it was within
83 Y3 to 98 2 feet of the center of the pavement at the crossing. These

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 732.
Id. at 730-31.
Id. at 731.
Id. at 732.
361 Mo. 234, 234 S.W.2d 524 (En Banc 1950).
Id. at 245, 234 S.W.2d at 531.
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distances are less than the stopping distance of the train after notice to the

engineer.

"132

The court appeared to disregard the oft repeated rule that a party is not
bound by his own estimates of speed and distance, but may avail himself
of the more favorable estimates of other witnesses. 133 The court said only
that if the testimony of the railroad's witnesses was taken to establish the
relevant speeds and distances, "the situation for plaintiff is little
improved. '"134In other words, there were no "more favorable" estimates,
or at least none that were "more favorable" enough to make any difference.
Still, to consider part one of a witness's testimony true for the purpose of
nullifying part two smacks of arbitrary selectivity.
Propositions of fact regarding speeds and distances have been successfully
invoked to nullify a defendant's extrajudicial statement of opinion, offered
at trial by the plaintiff, that the defendant could have avoided the collision.
In Osborn v. McBride,135 the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed ajury verdict and judgment for defendant McBride in a right angle automobile collision case, holding that the trial court had not erred in refusing to give the
jury Osborn's instruction on humanitarian negligence. In doing so, the court
rather casually nullified testimony of McBride's out-of-court statement that
he could have avoided the accident by swerving right instead of left, saying
that the testimony was not sufficient, "in light of the physical facts as disclosed
by the evidence,"1 36 to make a submissible case under the humanitarian doctrine. Making calculations from the testimony of speeds and distances most
favorable to Osborn137 and from a tacitly judicially noticed reaction time
of three-fourths of a second, the court satisfied itself that McBride had "at
38
most a little less than 23 feet in which to swerve and miss plaintiffs car."1
The court concluded that Osborn had "introduced no evidence to show that
this could have been done"' 1 9 and that there was "no basis to assume or
infer that defendant could have swerved further to the right than to the
left.' 140 By taking the speeds and distances most favorable to Osborn as
established in the case, the court arguably satisfied that requirement of
physical facts reasoning. Beyond that, the holding probably is explained by
the procedural posture of the case on appeal. This was not a case in which
a jury verdict fell with the nullified testimony, but one in which judge and
jury saw the merits the same way.
132. Id. at 243-44, 234 S.W.2d at 530.
133. See, e.g., Vaeth v. Gegg, 486 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Mo. 1972); Hecker v.
Schwartz, 426 S.W.2d 22, 25 (Mo. 1968); Smith v. Siercks, 277 S.W.2d 521, 525
(Mo. 1955); Fowler v. Robinson, 465 S.W.2d 5, 9 (Mo. App., St. L. 1971).
134. 361 Mo. at 244, 234 S.W.2d at 530.
135. 400 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. 1966).
136. Id. at 190.
137. Id. at 188.
138. Id. at 190.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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ii. Accident Cases in Which a Plaintiffs Proof Was Not Nullified
by the "Physical Facts" Equation
In many of these cases, the arguments for nullification were especially
weak. In Garrisonv. Ryno,141 for example, Garrison testified that defendant
Kent had driven his car and tow onto the highway from the north without
stopping as required, causing the car in which Garrison was approaching
from the east to skid into an oncoming truck. On appeal from a verdict and
judgment for Garrison, Kent argued that this testimony "was so contrary
to physical laws and facts of common knowledge that it could not be accepted
as substantial evidence." 1 42 Applying the judicially noticeable premise "that
it is a law of physics that a beam or reflection from a light will travel in a
straight line" 143 to Garrison's own testimony that Garrison saw the taillights
of Kent's vehicles but no headlights,144 Kent argued that his car and tow
must necessarily already have been facing west on the highway when Garrison first saw it, not approaching the intersection from the north as Garrison had testified.
Affirming the judgment for Garrison, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected Kent's argument, noting that Garrison had also testified that the Kent
vehicles, when he first saw them, were already" 'veering in a southwesterly
direction' "145 in the kind of wide-arc, no-stop turning maneuver the driver
of an awkward two-vehicle unit might well employ in making a right turn
1 46
upgrade onto a highway from a road " 'very slick' with ice and snow.'
Because the jury could believe any of these factual propositions, Kent's crucial
premise "that the tow-bar unit was approaching the intersection at right
angles"

147

was, as the court correctly observed, "not an established fact."

148

In conclusion, the court said,
Reasonable minds might conclude that on a dark night a beam or
reflection from.., two sets of red taillights approaching an intersection at an angle, 40 or 50 feet from the intersection, might be seen
from a point on the intersecting highway 400 to 500 feet distant from
the intersection; that the headlights of such a vehicle might not be
noticed, where the vehicle was going upgrade as it approached the
would be cast up into
intersection-that the beam of the headlights
149
road.
the
upon
down
than
rather
air
the
Kent's argument from "physical laws and facts of common knowledge" was
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

328 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1959).
Id. at 560.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id.
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so well answered by the court's application of "common knowledge" that
it is uncertain with what modicum of confidence Kent advanced it. Ifjudicial
repetition of the physical facts vocabulary encourages many such misapplications, it exacts a high price in misdirected professional energy for the small
150
and illusory comfort of certainty it affords.
In many accident cases in which nullification was denied, the given term
of the equation was not established in the case. Garrisonaffords an instructive example in an unusual setting. Another exemplary precedent of a less
usual configuration is Closser v. Becker.15 1 In that case, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that testimony by Closser and his witness that Glosser was standing by his truck when he was hit by Becker's truck was not nullified by
"established physical facts" consisting of "the uncontradicted evidence
of
the police officers that the only indication of any contact of the defendant's
truck with plaintiff was small spots of blood and hair on the rim of the outer
right rear wheel of the truck." 1 5 2 This evidence, Becker apparently contended, established that Glosser had fallen into Becker's passing truck.153 "The
fallacy of defendant's contention," said the court, "is that the testimony
of his witnesses as to the blood and hair on the rim of the outer rear wheel
is not conceded to be factually correct. "154 In other words, it was not established in the case.
In a large and more usual subcategory of cases, the proffered given term
was testimonial estimates of speeds and distances. The courts have quite consistently said that "the 'physical facts' rule has no application where variable
or doubtful estimates are made with respect to the facts."' 5 5 For example,
in Vaeth v. Gegg,' 56 plaintiff Vaeth sought to nullify defendant-counterclaimant15 7 Gegg's testimonial estimate of Vaeth's excessive speed by treating
as established Gegg's testimonial estimate of the distance at which he first
saw Vaeth's approaching vehicle and making certain calculations from that
distance. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed a verdict and judgment
for Gegg on his counterclaim.
Dawson v. Scherff5 8affords another good example of the same genre.
Dawson sued Scherff for crowding him into a bridge abutment as Dawson
150. For other marginal invocations of the "physical facts" vocabulary, see
cases cited note 47 supra.
151. 308 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1958).
152. Id. at 736.
153. Id. at 731.
154. Id. at 736. For other cases featuring this fallacy, see, e.g., Wiser v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 301 S.W.2d 37 (Mo. 1957); Gurwell v. Jefferson City Lines, Inc., 239
Mo. App. 305, 192 S.W.2d 683 (K.C. 1946).
155. Vaeth v. Gegg, 486 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Mo. 1972).
156. Id. at 625.
157. With regard to his counterclaim, Gegg's position was that of a plaintiff.
See note 21 supra.
158. 281 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. 1955).
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attempted to overtake Scherff's truck. Scherff contended that he never drove
out of his lane and that Dawson was well behind Scherff's truck when Dawson
hit the abutment. In defending a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on
appeal, Scherff argued from certain propositions of fact in evidence "that
it was a physical impossibility for the facts to have been as plaintiff testified
they were." 15 9 The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, 160 saying that "the
mere fact that some of plaintiff's estimates of speed or of the relative positions of the vehicles at a given point cannot be reconciled with physical facts
does not of itself make his case non-submissible."161

Of the few accident cases surmounting the hurdle posed by the requirement that the given term of the physical facts equation be established in the
case, most stumble on the requirement that the function on which the equation depends be judicially noticeable. In Low'y v. Mohn, 62 an action arising out of an automobile collision at an intersection, Mohn won a directed
verdict at the close of Lowry's case. Mohn contended on appeal that "the
physical facts, particularly the positions of the respective automobiles when
they had come to rest after the collision, and the nature of the damage...
conclusively demonstrate[d] that the collision was solely caused by the
negligence of... [Lowry's driver]." 163 The Missouri Supreme Court was
not persuaded to take judicial notice, saying, "[W]e do not certainly know
that the contact of the moving vehicles colliding at a right angle would not
have caused them to come to rest after the collision in the stated locations
and positions, although the collision be considered to have occurred as stated
by plaintiff's witnesses."1 64 Reversing Mohn's directed verdict as erroneously
granted, the court reasoned, "Taking into consideration all of the physical
facts of which defendant has reminded us, we cannot say that the collision
could not have possibly occurred in the manner as detailed by plaintiff's
witnesses. ",165
In Phillips v. Stockman, 166 the Springfield Court of Appeals similarly
declined the defendants' invitation to reconstruct the accident as a matter
of law. InJones v. Smith,167 the Missouri Supreme Court refused, in a soft
alternative holding, to take judicial notice of the standard three-fourths of
a second reaction time. To do so would have nullified certain occurrence
testimony of Jones's witness.

68

159. Id. at 829.
160. The court, however, affirmed the alternative grant of a new trial because
the jury verdict for plaintiff was against the great weight of the evidence. Id. at 831.
161. Id. at 829-30.
162. 195 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. 1946).
163. Id. at 656.
164. Id. at 657.
165. Id.
166. 351 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. App., Spr. 1961).
167. 372 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. 1963).
168. Id. at 75.
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b. Miscellaneous Reconstruction of Incidents
The greater number of physical facts precedents are tort cases that use
established propositions about certain physical facts to nullify testimony about
otlher physical facts, i.e., if A happened, which is taken to be established,
then B could not have happened. Some of the criminal precedents invoking physical facts reasoning are also of this kind,169 but other criminal physical
facts cases are of a more curious genre. In the latter cases, it was argued with
regard to self-defense and even held with regard to assault with intent to kill
that established propositions about physical facts may nullify testimony about
intent, which scarcely fits any commonly held definition of "physical fact."
i. Self-defense
State v. Chamineak170

will serve as an example. Chamineak was tried for
second-degree murder in the shotgun killing of Hogan. Chamineak had shot
Hogan in the head while Hogan sat in the right front seat of a car parked
in front of the house where Chamineak lived with Hogan's former wife.
Chamineak admitted that he had approached the car and Hogan from the
right rear, but testified that he raised his shotgun and fired only when he
heard Hogan's brother say," 'Now is your chance, Harold [Hogan],' "171
and saw Hogan "come up with that pistol.'

1 72

Although this and other

testimony suggesting self-defense had been adduced, the trial court refused
to instruct the jury on self-defense, and Chamineak was convicted.
On appeal, the state argued that "Chamineak's 'evidence of self-defense
* is so inconsistent with the physical facts disclosed by the record that
the Court was not obliged to accept it as substantial evidence.' "173The state
referred to
all the circumstances and specifically to the fact that Chamineak approached the automobile from the rear, the fact that Harold was
right-handed and was facing the windshield, the fact that no loaded gun was found in the automobile [although an unloaded one was]
and none on Harold's person [although a blackjack was, and] the
fact that the course of the shotgun pellets was from the back of his
74
right ear to his left eye.'
The Missouri Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in failing
to instruct on self-defense, saying,
It is not now necessary to consider the precise function of the [physical
facts] rule, or to examine its rationale and limitations, or even to
consider its applicability in criminal cases; its applicability is assumed
169.

See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 309 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Mo. 1958).

170.

328 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1959).

171.
172.

Id. at 13.
Id.

173. Id.
174. Id.
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even though it is doubtful that any criminal case involving self5
defense has in point of fact turned alone upon the rule. 17
In State v. Tindall,176 while reviewing a conviction for second-degree
murder, the Kansas City Court of Appeals said, "This testimony of selfdefense was refuted in almost every vital particular by the state's evidence
and physical facts, but we believe, and so hold, that it was sufficient to warrant the submission of self-defense to the jury."' 177 Similarly, in State v.
Malone,178 another second-degree murder case, the Missouri Supreme Court
said, "However improbable may seem defendant's story... we cannot
judicially say it is impossible. Its truth or falsity was for the jury to
determine. '179
ii. Assault with Intent to Kill
Defendants have not fared as well in prosecutions for assault with intent to kill. In State v. Cooksey, 80° the most recent instance, the Missouri
Supreme Court affirmed Cooksey's conviction of assault with intent to kill
without malice, saying, "In the circumstances of this case, her [testimonial]
denial of an intent to kill Chambers is so inconsistent with and contrary to
her actions and common experience that no instruction on common assault
was required." 18 1 The court cited State v. Bevineau,18 2 a prosecution for assault
with intent to kill with malice aforethought, in which the supreme court said,
"[D]enial of intention to kill does not necessarily require an instruction for
a lesser degree of the offense charged when 'the statements of defendant were
so incumbered with the physical facts and conduct of defendant, so
unreasonable and inconsistent with the experience of mankind * * * '

"183

The rhetoric is persuasive as a jury argument, but not as an argument for
excluding the jury from full participation in the determination. The holdings
18 4
of Cooksey and Bevineau arguably were unconstitutional when rendered.
18 5
suspect.
Similar holdings, if rendered today, would be even more
2.

Forensic Determinations of Visibility

From a tactical perspective, two types of cases occur in which propositions of fact about visibility become crucial. In one, attention focuses on the
175. Id.
176. 496 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. App., K.C. 1973).
177. Id. at 269.
178. 327 Mo. 1217, 39 S.W.2d 786 (1931).
179. Id. at 1227, 39 S.W.2d at 789.
180. 499 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. 1973).
181. Id. at 489.
182. 460 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 1970).
183. Id. at 688 (quoting State v. Nelson, 118 Mo. 124, 23 S.W. 1088(1893)).
184. Seeln reWinship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790
(1952); Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
185. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); County Court v. Allen,
439 U.S. 815 (1979); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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plaintiff's prima facie case; he contends that a visual obstruction negligently maintained by the defendant proximately caused his injury. 186 In response,
the defendant invokes the physical facts equation to nullify the plaintiffs
proof of obstructed visibility. In the other type of case, attention focuses on
an affirmative defense; the defendant contends that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing to look or for failing to
see what was plainly visible. 18 7 In support, the defendant invokes the physical
facts equation, arguing typically that he has established an overwhelming
case on the elements of an affirmative defense for which he bears the burden
of persuasion.
As far as the operation of the physical facts equation is concerned, the
two kinds of cases seem interchangeable. If the defendant's version of what
could have been seen is established certainly enough to nullify the plaintiff's
testimony to the contrary, it is also established certainly enough to win a
directed verdict on the affirmative defense of contributory negligence. Thus,
for the purpose of examining the operation of the physical facts equation,
the two kinds of cases will be treated together.
Some of the cases turning on propositions of fact about visibility invoke
judicial notice so subtly that only thoughtful scrutiny reveals them to be function cases. A proposition of fact about visibility may be supported by
unassisted oral testimony or by oral testimony assisted by photographs or
drawings of various kinds, e.g., charts, diagrams, maps, plats, and sketches.
a. Unassisted Oral Testimony
Unassisted oral testimony depends for its efficacy on the generalization
that the plaintiff would or could have seen before the incident exactly what
the witness saw while examining the scene thereafter. 8 s This generalization depends on the judicially noticeable proposition that light always travels
in a straight line from object to eye 8 9 and on the proposition that every eye
always receives and processes the same light in the same way. 190 Whatever
scientificdoubts might be raised, the generalization that all people see alike
is firmly established "common knowledge" and passes typically without comment. When the plaintiffs unassisted oral testimony confronts the defendant's unassisted oral testimony, courts perceive without difficulty that the
contradiction presents a jury question.
186. See Parts III.A.-B. infra.
187. See Part III.C. infra.
188. This assumes that there has been no change of circumstances at the scene,
which itself poses an important subject for cross-examination.
189. See, e.g., Garrison v. Ryno, 328 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Mo. 1959).
190. See generally M. FINEMAN, THE INQUISITIVE EYE (1981); L. KAUFMAN,
PERCEPTION: THE WORLD TRANSFORMED (1979); L. KAUFMAN, SIGHT AND
MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO VISUAL PERCEPTION (1974); M. LUCKIESH,
VISUAL ILLUSIONS, THEIR CAUSES, CHARACTERISTICS AND APPLICATIONS

(1922).
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b. Oral Testimony Assisted by Photographs
Whether evidentiary configurations of oral testimony assisted by
photographs invoke any generalization in addition to the basic one that all
people see alike depends on the kind of foundation required to render
photographs admissible. Typically, a witness testifies that a certain
photograph is an accurate portrayal of what he saw. 191 This testimony is the
proof; the photograph serves only as an aid to expression. 192 There is no need
to assume that the eye would have seen what the camera saw; the witness
has sworn it to be so.
The matter stands differently, however, if the witness testifies merely
that the photograph was taken by a camera aimed in a certain direction from
a certain point. 193 Here, the trier must relate what the camera has seen to
what the eye would have seen looking in the same direction from the same
point. Indeed, the relevance of the camera-witness testimony depends on
the generalization that the plaintiff would or could have seen before the incident exactly what the camera saw while examining the scene thereafter.
Considering the variety of camera lenses, and that none is similar to the lens
of the human eye, this generalization is, at best, a risky subject of judicial
notice. 19 4 An even greater risk is that the photograph will so overwhelm the
trial participants that difficult problems about judicial notice will be passed
over without consideration; a photograph imposes a persuasive illusion of
truthfulness.
While the Missouri courts have generally handled physical. facts cases
well, their record in dealing with the visibility cases has not been consistently
distinguished. Lohmann v. Wabash Railroad,195 a decision of casebook

stature, 196 has already been discussed with disapproval. 197 The vice of the
decision lay in the court's ready acceptance of the photograph as a physical
fact or, at least, as the true portrayal of the physical facts at the time of the
collision without, so far as the opinion reveals, first ascertaining conscious191.
FACTS
192.
193.

See, e.g., C.

MCCORMICK, supra note 25,

§214; 9AM.JUR.

PROOF OF

147-52 (1961); 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence §§ 785-88 (1967).
See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, § 214, at 530.
This will seldom be the case. See, e.g., 9 AM.JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 150

(1961). Lohmann v. Wabash R.R., 269 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Mo. 1954), refers to
photographs "taken with the camera at different places north of the track on Eva
Avenue and pointed to the west," but this cannot, in context, be taken to mean
that further authentication was lacking.
194. See, e.g., S. SANSONE, MODERN PHOTOGRAPHY FOR POLICE AND
FIREMEN §§ 2.23-.40 (1971). Foran informative treatment of the uses ofphotography
in automobile accident litigation, see K. HUGHES & B. CANTOR, PHOTOGRAPHS
IN CIVIL LITIGATION 340-489 (1973).
195. 269 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. 1954).
196. SeeD. KARLEN, R. MEISENHOLDER, G. NEFF &A. VESTAL, CIVILPROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS 770-75 (1975).
197. See notes 28-39 and accompanying text supra.
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ly and specifically whether the testimonial foundation on which the
photograph depended was established beyond contradiction. The testimony
of Lohmann's three witnesses contradicted only implicitly the testimony
underlying the railroad's photograph. In this situation, courts easily forget
the admonition that "[t]he 'physical facts' rule... has no application...
where the credibility of witnesses is involved." 198 When photographs have
been explicitly contradicted by testimony

99

or other photographs, 20N courts

have perceived without difficulty the proposition that photographs are not
physical facts.
In a case in which the existence of a certain photograph was an element
of a claim or defense, the photograph itself, presented in court as real
evidence, would be a physical fact in the case. In any other substantive setting, however, and certainly in the usual vehicle negligence settings in which
they are used, photographs are never facts, physical or otherwise. They are
portrayals of propositions of fact-propositions about the situation that existed at a material time and place. Photographs without explanation establish
nothing. The proposition of fact underlying each photographic portrayal
must be established by testimony, to which the photograph is intended to
be an aid to understanding. 20 1 If the testimony is subject to disbelief, the
attested proposition of fact is not established in the case until the jury, by
its verdict, has said so. Legally and logically, the proposition of fact cannot
be bootstrapped by the photograph. Psychologically, however, it has been.
Silvey v. Missouri PacificRailroad20 2 dramatizes the danger inherent in this
psychological bootstrapping. The railroad's photographs showed a clearer
view down the tracks to the south than the view to which Silvey had testified.
Silvey also had photographs in evidence that showed "a very considerable
obscuring of the view to the south by trees.' '203 The Missouri Supreme Court
noted that, in one set of the railroad's photographs, "the camera was 'looking' over the tops of some of the trees and brush which obscure the vision
in plaintiff's photos.' '204
If Silvey's case on visibility had depended entirely on his own eyewitness
testimony, the court erroneously might have held for the railroad, saying,
in the words of Lohmann, "Giving consideration to all the physical facts as
established by... photographs we are compelled to rule that the testimony

198. Anderson v. Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc., 393 S.W.2d 452,460 (Mo.
1965). See also Davenport v. Wabash R.R., 435 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
199. See, e.g., Silvey v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 445 S.W.2d 354, 358 (Mo. 1969);

Ruhl v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 304 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Mo. 1957).

200.

See, e.g., Silvey v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 445 S.W.2d 354, 358 (Mo. 1969).

201. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supranote 25, § 214; 9AM.JUR. PROOF OF
FACTS 147-52 (1961); 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence §§ 785, 788 (1967).

202.
203.

445 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. 1969).
Id. at 358.

204.

Id.
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of ... [Silvey] is plainly contrary to the demonstrated physical facts,' '205
and concluding confidently that, if Silvey had looked, "he could and would
have seen the approaching train and stopped his truck, and waited for the
train to pass over the crossing.... The ...[trees and brush] did not obstruct
' 20 6
... [Silvey's] vision of the approaching train.
Silvey might have lost
to the magic of "physical facts," his credible testimony nullified by
photographs that did not at all portray what Silvey had actually seen, or could
have seen, as he approached the crossing.
Ruhl v.Missouri Pacific Railroad,20 7 an earlier precedent, is unlike Silvey
in that Ruhl introduced no antidotal photographs, but instructively like Silvey
at the crucial point: Ruhl did contradict the railroad's photographs directly
by oral testimony. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Ruhl'sjudgment
for the wrongful death of his wife, saying, "In these circumstances what may
be seen from a certain place is not 'admitted or undisputed' . . . and does
not conclusively or indisputably establish the physical facts,' '208 and concluding in words that deserve to be quoted more often than they have been:
"[T]here is no rule which permits appellate courts to disturb a jury's findings because highly convincing photographic evidence may seem to overbalance the parol or other evidence to the contary. "209
Unlike the photographs in Silvey and Ruhl, the photographs on which
the railroad relied in Zumault v.Wabash Railroad2 10 were put in evidence by
the plaintiff, but, as in those cases, the Missouri Supreme Court did not accept the photographs as conclusive, proof-nullifying portrayals of what the
plaintiff must have seen as he approached the crossing just before the accident. Affirming a judgment for Zumault against the railroad's contention
that he was contributorily negligent for failing "to look for or see the approaching train, "211 the court said of the photographs, "They were not taken
from points on ... [the street upon which plaintiff was traveling] and at
a height so as to be fairly representative of what plaintiff could see from his
automobile as he approached the crossing." 2 12 Nor did the measurements
of sight distances put in evidence by the railroad nullify Zumault's testimony
that his view of the speeding train was obscured by weeds on the right-ofway. "Taken as they were in the winter time almost two and a half years
after the accident," said the court, "the weeds and foliage conditions were
not the same.' '213 The court was perhaps particularly willing to leave the
railroad to the mercy of the jury because the train, according to the testimony
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Lohmann v. Wabash R.R., 269 S.W.2d 885, 891 (Mo. 1954).
Id. at 892.
304 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1957).
Id. at 18.
Id.
302 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. 1957).
Id. at 862.
Id.at 864.
Id.
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of the fireman, was going seventy to seventy-eight miles per hour within the
214
city limits at the time of the collision.
Black v. Kansas City Southern Railway215 seems, in its secondary holding,
to fall away from the more careful jurisprudence of Ruhl and Zumault, but
some good lessons still can be drawn from the opinion. The Missouri
Supreme Court reversed Black'sjudgment for damages suffered in a crossing collision and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the jury
instruction submitting negligence in maintaining a visual obstruction had
been prejudicially confusing and misleading. 216 The court further held that
Black had not made a submissible case of negligence in maintaining a visual
obstruction and ordered that "the issue should not be submitted as an independent ground of negligence on a retrial." 217 The factual issue on that
part of the decision was whether all of the view-obscuring vegetation was
on private property adjoining the railroad's right-of-way or whether at least
some of it was on the right-of-way. Black's son had testified that there were
218
trees and shrubs, some of which were 15 to 20 feet tall, on the right-of-way,
but the court nullified that testimony, relying apparently on six photographs
21 9
in the trial record.
So far, the case seems dishearteningly like Lohmann. In Black, however,
the court took reasonable care to say how the photographs were put in the
record, what claim to objectivity and authenticity could be laid for them,
and whether the party whose verdict they would defeat had considered them
carefully and minimized them as best he could. Moreover, Black's son,
prompted on cross-examination by one of the photographs, contradicted his
earlier testimony. Whether the court's holding against submissibility was
correct depends, therefore, not on whether the son's initial testimony was
nullified by the physical facts equation, but whether it was effectively retracted
by his later, more definite self-contradictory testimony.
When the court said, "There is no suggestion that... [the photographs]
do not accurately portray the physical facts then existing,' '220 it stated a conclusion based on a reasonably careful and explicit exposition of the record.
Three of the photographs were put in evidence by Black, 22' and one of those
showed "that along the fence on the west side of the highway right of way
there... [was] an impenetrable growth of vegetation that completely...
[obscured] any growth that might have existed along the Railroad right of
way fence. "222 In other testimonial contexts, a plaintiff is not bound by his
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 864-65.
436 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
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own unfavorable testimony, 223 but here, the plaintiff's attorney most likely

will commission or choose photographs that put the most favorable face
possible on his client's case, and this supposition gives some reassurance that
a self-defeating photograph is authentic.
The other three photographs were, as the parties stipulated, "taken by
the official photographer for the Kansas Highway Patrol about one and onehalf hours after the accident happened.' '224 In the court's view, one of these
photographs "completely ... [refuted] the estimates given by witnesses that
there were trees within 15 or 20 feet of the tracks." 225 Although this decisive
photograph was put in evidence by the railroad, its authenticity is suggested
by its origin and by other circumstances found in the record and related by
the court. If it was one of the "[n]umerous photographs . . . placed in

evidence and used by all the parties at the trial," 226 then the plaintiff's use
at trial of a photograph unfavorable to his theory gives some reasonable
ground to suppose that, after due consideration, he had conceded its authenticity. Under appropriate circumstances, even a tacit concession of this sort
might properly be deemed a judicial admission.
The initial testimony of Black's son afforded the only suggestion that
the photographs did not accurately portray what could have been seen on
approaching the crossing. On cross-examination, however, he stated that
the Kansas Highway Patrol photographs "portrayed the right of way as he
had seen it when he was there.' '227 The testimony of the other witnesses apparently was also consistent with the conclusion drawn by the court from
the decisive photograph that "the only growth on the right of way west of
the tracks... [was] grasses and weeds that could not possibly prevent a person
on the highway seeing a train approaching from the southwest.'"228 Thus,
in the court's implicit view, whatever ostensibly contradictory testimony there
might ever have been had, at the close of the evidence, been effectively
retracted.
This view of the case presents Black as correctly applying the principle
of physical facts reasoning that a photographic portrayal is established in
the case only if it is not contradicted either explicitly or implicitly. Black would
have been a more difficult case, and arguably wrongly decided, had Black's
son maintained to the end his testimony that there were tall trees on the defendant's right-of-way. Such testimony would have contradicted implicitly the
photograph that showed no tall trees on the right-of-way. To require explicit
contradiction would impose on a party whose verdict a photograph would
223. See, e.g., Vaeth v. Gegg, 486 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. 1972); Hecker v. Schwartz,
426 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1968); Smith v. Siercks, 277 S.W.2d 521 (Mo. 1955); Fowler
v. Robinson, 465 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. App., St. L. 1971).
224. 436 S.W.2d at 28-29.
225. Id. at 29.
226. Id. at 28.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 29.
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defeat a burden of consummate advocacy that would weigh heavily on his
constitutional right to ajury determination. Not every deserving party will
find'counsel capable of such advocacy. Had Black's son maintained his initial testimony to the end, there would have been a strong argument that
he should not have been believed, but it would, in the view most favoring
the constitutional right to jury determination, have been a jury argument,
not an argument to be entertained and resolved by the court.
Notwithstanding the stiff competition provided by Lohmann, Davenport
v. Wabash Railroad229 affords perhaps the worst example in the Missouri
precedents of utter disregard for the principle of physical facts reasoning,
just discussed, that a photographic portrayal is not established in the case
if it is contradicted, even indirectly. In Davenport, an action for the wrongful
death of plaintiff's husband at defendant's dangerous crossing, the Missouri
Supreme Court treated as established in the case certain photographs showing
good visibility at the defendant's railroad crossing, notwithstanding the
testimony of two nonparty witnesses that "the weeds north of the track were
cut after the day of the accident," 230 and that "the weeds that were mowed
later would obscure the view of a southbound train until a person was
C* * * up pretty close to the track.' "231 The court cited Lohmann and agreed
with the railroad that this testimony "must be disregarded because [it was]
at variance with the physical facts showing that deceased's view to the north
was not obscured and that the train was in plain sight as he approached the
crossing.' '232 The court reversed the widow's judgment and remanded with
orders to enter judgment for the railroad.
-The nullified testimony contradicted the photographs only indirectly.
To contradict them directly, the two witnesses would have to have been confronted with the photographs and would have had to say, as did the witnesses
in Silvey233 and Ruhl,234 that the photographs did not accurately portray the

scene at the time of the accident. It is hard to imagine, however, indirect
contradiction more direct in its implications for the verisimilitude of the
photographs than testimony that "the weeds that were mowed later would
obscure the view. '235 The opinion takes no care to establish whether the
weeds were cut before the photographs were taken and perhaps the record
provided no certain answer. The jury, however, could have concluded
justifiably, as it seemingly did, that the tall weeds had been cut before the
exculpatory photographs were taken.
229. 435 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
230. Id. at 645.
231. Id. at 646.
232. Id. at 647.
233. Silvey v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 445 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. 1969). See notes
202-06 and accompanying text supra.
234. Ruhl v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 304 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1957). Seenotes 207-09
and accompanying text supra.
235. 435 S.W.2d at 646.
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What if the photographs were right? What if there never were any viewobscuring weeds at the crossing? It may well be that the testimony of these
two witnesses was viewed with "disdain by persons who had been at the
scene. But the jury was not at the scene. We are concerned only with what
the jury might allowably 'know.' . . . We must look at the 'physical fact'

from the jug's point of view, not from that of the witness.' '236 Confusion
about physical facts reasoning typically is "caused by shifting one's point
of view from the jury box to the scene of the event. '237 No judicially known
principle permits the court to disbelieve Davenport's two crucial witnesses.
The jury believed them and disbelieved the witnesses who, with the aid of
photographs, testified otherwise. That should have been the end of it.
What common threads run through these cases? First, the appellate decisions do not seem to show more than the usual deference for the trial courts'
judgments about the probative force of photographs. Some rulings that
photographs were not conclusive were affirmed on appeal, 23 8 while another
was reversed. 239 On the other hand, no discovered ruling that photographs
were conclusive has been reversed on appeal, while several have been
affirmed. 240 Second, there seems to be a certain visceral jurisprudence running through the decisions. Appellate courts sometimes acquire their own
strongly held feeling about what actually happened in the human drama portrayed by a certain trial record under review. If an appellate court's feeling
does not coincide with the jury's verdict, the court overrides the jury, employing the apparently value-neutral rhetoric of the jurisprudence of proof to
make the result seem compelled by principle. It is arguably not appropriate
even for intermediate appellate courts to act as centralized "superjuries."
Much less is it appropriate for supreme courts to do so.
According to the prevalent theory about the proper distribution offunctions in a modern, two-tiered system of appellate courts, intermediate appellate courts should review "cases which are of importance only to the individuals affected. "241 Supreme courts should review only "the cases which
are of institutional importance,' '242 resolving inconsistencies among intermediate appellate courts and deciding controlling questions of legal prin236. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 58.
237. Id.
238. Van Buskirk v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 349 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1961);
Ruhl v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 304 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1957); Zumault v. Wabash R.R.,
302 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. 1957).
239. Davenport v. Wabash R.R., 435 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
240. Lohmann v. Wabash R.R., 269 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. 1954); Donald
v.Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 364 Mo. 919, 231 S.W.2d 627 (1950).
241.

P.

CARRINGTON,

D. MEADOR & M.

ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL

4 (1976). This power to review for correctness should be administered with restraint.
See generally L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930); Green,Juiy Trialand Mr.Justice
Black, 65 YALE L.J. 482 (1956); Wright, The Doubtful OmniscienceofAppellate Courts,
41 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1957).
242. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 241, at 4.
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ciple. None of the visibility cases examined even remotely presented a question of legal principle. Each found the Missouri Supreme Court deep in the
business of supplanting the factual determinations of local juries concerning
issues of importance only to the individuals affected.
But all of these cases were decided before 1970. In that year and in 1976,
Missouri amended the appellate jurisdictional provisions of its constitution,
creating an improved scheme of appellate jurisdiction seemingly designed
with the modern, two-tiered system in mind. 243 Since these amendments,
the Missouri courts of appeals have heard most of the physical facts
arguments. 2 " They cannot avoid completely, as the supreme court now can,
the invitation to review evidence that the invocation of physical facts
represents. The appellate courts can, however, reduce their workloads by
carefully placed decisional signals. One such signal would make it clear that
jury verdicts are no longer vulnerable on appeal to physical facts arguments
depending on photographs.There is already good authority for that proposition in Missouri. Silvey and Zumault afford sound holdings on which to
build. 245 Of particularly prophylactic effect is the language of Ruhl: "[T]here
is no rule which permits appellate courts to disturb ajury's findings because
highly convincing photographic evidence may seem to overbalance the parol
2 46
or other evidence to the contrary."
243. MO. CONST. art. 5, §§ 3, 4, 10.
244. According to a search of the appropriate Missouri libraries of the
Lexis© computer research service conducted on May 17, 1982, just twenty-five
supreme court opinions dated 1970 or later, only six of which are dated 1976 or
later, have used the phrase "physical facts." Twelve of those were casual uses. Of
the others, only three have required textual treatment herein. See State v. Newlon,
627 S.W.2d 606 (Mo. En Banc 1982) (casual use in dissent); State v. Harris, 620
S.W.2d 349 (Mo. En Banc 1981); State v. Newberry, 605 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1980);
Welch v. Hyatt, 578 S.W.2d 905 (Mo. En Banc 1979); Epple v. Western Auto
Supply Co., 548 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. En Banc 1977); State v. Gotthardt, 540 S.W.2d
62 (Mo. En Banc 1976); Saupe v. Kertz, 523 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. En Banc 1975);
Cline v. Carthage Crushed Limestone Co., 504 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. 1973) (casual
use); State v. Gibson, 502 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1973) (casual use); State v. Cooksey,
499 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. 1973); Bounds v. Scott Constr. Co., 498 S.W.2d 765 (Mo.
1973); State v. Dodson, 490 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. 1973) (casual use); Price v. Bangert
Bros. Road Builders, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. 1973) (casual use); Carter v. Consolidated Cabs, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1973); State v. Parton, 487 S.W.2d 523
(Mo. 1972) (casual use); Vaeth v. Gegg, 486 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. 1972); State v. Cannon, 486 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. 1972) (casual use); State v. Starks, 472 S.W.2d 407
(Mo. 1971) (casual use); State v. Simerly, 463 S.W.2d 846 (Mo. 1971) (casual use);
Tuckerv. Central Hardware Co., 463 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. 1971) (casual use); Commerford v. Kreitler, 462 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. 1971); State v. Bevineau, 460 S.W.2d
.683 (Mo. 1970); Garton v. State, 454 S.W.2d 522 (Mo. 1970) (casual use); Headrick
v. Dowdy, 450 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1970); State v. Stidham, 449 S.W.2d 634 (Mo.
1970) (casual use).
245. See notes 202-06 & 210-14 and accompanying text supra.
246. Ruhl v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 304 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Mo. 1957).
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Van Buskirk v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad47 exhibits the least reverence
toward photographs. Van Buskirk sued the railroad for the wrongful deaths
of his wife and three children, who were struck and killed by the railroad's
train at a grade crossing on a country road. Both the railroad track and the
road approached the crossing through grade cuts four or five feet deep. As
no one seemed to contest, "at the top of the cut and on the railroad right
of way there were weeds approximately five or six feet high.'"248 Van Buskirk
submitted his case on two theories, negligence in failing to warn and
negligence "in maintaining weeds and foliage upon... [the railroad's] right
of way which 'dangerously and materially obstructed' the view of Mrs. Van
Buskirk of the immediate approach of the train to the crossing.' '249 Having
no eyewitnesses of his own to the collision, Van Buskirk testified that "[b]etween ten feet from the rail, back to the right of way fence," a driver could
see nothing. 250 In opposition, the railroad put2 5in
evidence photographs that
1
demonstrated the view from various points.
In affirming ajudgment for Van Buskirk, the Missouri Supreme Court
held that his testimony was "not ... contrary to physical fact.' '252 Concerning the railroad's photographs, the court conceded that they "tended to
show that if Mrs. Van Buskirk had been looking she could have seen the
approaching train,' '253 but went on to add that "the photographs indicate
that there was considerable obstruction to a clear view.' '254 The court concluded, "However, the photographs were 'simply evidence' which was not
binding on plaintiff or jury."

2 55

c. Oral Testimony Assisted by Drawings
As with oral testimony assisted by photographs, whether evidentiary configurations of oral testimony assisted by drawings invoke any generalization in addition to the basic one that all people see alike depends on the kind
of foundation required to render drawings admissible.25 6 Thus, precedents
considering the use of drawings are analytically interchangeable with
precedents considering the use of photographs, and indeed, photographs and
2 57
drawings often appear in the same cases.

247. 349 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1961).
248. Id. at 69.
249. Id. at 70.
250. Id. at 71.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 72.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, § 213.
257. See, e.g., Black v. Kansas City S.R.R., 436 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. En Banc
1968); Ruhl v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 304 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1957); Zumault v. Wabash
R.R., 302 S.W.2d 861 (Mo. 1957); Lohmann v. Wabash R.R., 269 S.W.2d 885
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Although, for the purpose of physical facts analysis, photographs and
drawings are logically interchangeable, they may well be psychologically
noninterchangeable. Once in evidence, a photograph creates its own impact. A drawing often depends for its impact on the credentials of its creator.
II. INVOKING "PHYSICAL FACTS" TO ESTABLISH AN
OVERWHELMING CASE

The previous section has shown how physical facts reasoning is invoked
against plaintiffs to nullify prima facie proof. This section examines how
physical facts reasoning is invoked by plaintiffs to magnify prima facie proof,
i.e., to support the argument that an overwhelming case has been presented.
In both this section and the last, the term "plaintiff' encompasses all parties who bear the risk of nonproduction of evidence on an issue brought under
scrutiny by a motion for a directed verdict or a verdict-directing instruction. For example, a defendant 'asserting a counterclaim or affirmative
defense bears the risk of nonproduction on all issues essential thereto and
is thus a plaintiff for purposes of this discussion. The term "overwhelming
case" means that extraordinary state of the proofs in which a party is entitled to a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict on his
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party claim, or affirmative defense.
When an overwhelming case has been made for an affirmative defense, it
is often said that the affirmative defense has been established as a matter
8
of law.

25

Just as most arguments for overwhelmingness on other grounds have
failed, so have most arguments for overwhelmingness built on physical facts
reasoning. A few, however, have succeeded.
A. Overwhelming Case-in-Chief
In no discovered case has the force of physical facts reasoning alone won
for a plaintiff a directed verdict on his case-in-chief. 259 Saupe v. Kertz2 60 is
illustrative. Saupe asserted physical facts-testimony and supporting drawings and photographs concerning skidmarks, gouge marks, and debris-to
establish an overwhelming case that the vehicle driven by Kertz's decedent
had been on the wrong side of the highway just before the collision on Saupe's
wrong side of the highway. Saupe had to rely solely on this circumstantial

(Mo. 1954); Donald v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 364 Mo. 919, 231 S.W.2d 627
(1950).
258. Davenport v. Wabash R.R., 435 S.W.2d 641,642-43,648 (Mo. En Banc
1968); Lohmann v. Wabash R.R., 364 Mo. 910, 918, 921, 269 S.W.2d 885, 890,
892 (1954).

259. But cf. Wilkins v. Stuecken, 359 Mo. 1047, 225 S.W.2d 131 (1949) (submission to jury of sole cause instruction held erroneous because defendant's own
evidence showed defendant's negligence as a matter of law).
260. 523 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
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evidence because his own direct
testimony was inadmissible under the
61
2
Missouri Dead Man's Statute.

The Missouri Supreme Court reversed a judgment for Kertz and
remanded for a new trial because of error in the instructions on contributory
negligence, but rejected Saupe's argument for a directed verdict, because
the physical facts did not "show conclusively that, at the time he moved his
[Saupe's] truck toward the west lane, the southbound automobile was or
was not still in the wrong lane. Nor, for that matter," the court continued,
was "there any evidence showing where on the highway either of the two
vehicles were, the distance that separated them, or their respective speeds,
' 262
when the driver of one first saw, or could have seen, the other.
Somewhere in the legal literature there may be a decision in which a
plaintiff has won a directed verdict on the strength of physical facts reasoning, but it should come as no surprise if there is not. The more usual battle
rages not around overwhelmingness, but around submissibility, i.e., whether
the force of physical facts reasoning on circumstantial evidence entitles the
plaintiff to ajury determination. 263 The plaintiff ordinarily must be grateful
for a ruling that he is still in court. To ask for more requires a kind of innocent overconfidence not often found.
B. Overwhelming Proof of Counterclaim, Cross-Claim, or Third-Party Claim
A party who occupies the position of defendant in the principal action
may assert a claim against the plaintiff, a codefendant, or a third-party defendant. With respect to that claim, he is a plaintiff, and any proposition about
proof or procedure that applies generally to plaintiffs applies to him as well.
No illustrative overwhelming case is presented here, because none has been
found. As discussed above, this is not surprising.
C. Overwhelming Proofof Affirmative Defense
In a surprising number of cases the force of physical facts reasoning has
won for a defendant a directed verdict on his affirmative defense. Virtually
all have been vehicle negligence cases in which a defendant asserted an affirmative defense of contributory negligence. In some, the court, in effect,
reconstructed the accident as a matter of law; in others, the court determined
visibility as a matter of law.
1. Reconstructing Accidents as a Matter of Law
Vehicular accidents are reconstructed from propositions about the location, extensity, and intensity of skidmarks and gouges; the location, nature,
and severity of damage to vehicles; the postaccident positions of vehicles;
the location, kind, and quantity of impact debris; and speeds and distances.
261.
262.

Mo. REV. STAT. 5 491.010 (1969).
523 S.W.2d at 829.

263. See Part IV. infra.
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In probative force, these five categories of "physical facts" rank in about
the order stated, depending somewhat on whether a case turns predominantly
on precollision positions or precollision forces. Rarely is any one proposition the sole determinant.
Williams v. Cavender2 64 presents a virtual practice manual for the
reconstruction of accidents from circumstantial evidence. Williams's husband and Cavender's daughter were both killed in the head-on collision of
the automobiles they were driving. There were no passengers and no
eyewitnesses. The sole witness "of any real consequence' '265 at the trial of
Williams's action for wrongful death was the highway patrolman who had
investigated and reported the accident. His testimony placed skidmarks,
damage, and debris as he had found them at the scene. Cavender moved
for a directed verdict at the close of Williams's case and, when that was
denied, rested without presenting any evidence. The jury returned a verdict for Williams, and Cavender appealed from the judgment on the verdict. The Missouri Supreme Court discussed at great length the skidmarks,
damage, and debris, constructing an impressive chain of circumstantial
reasoning leading to the alternative conclusions that there was "no substantial
evidence of negligence on Miss Cavender's part" 266 and that" [t]he positive
evidence of the skidmark of the... [Williams car] convicts plaintiffs decedent of negligence directly causing or contributing to the collision, as a matter
of law.' '267
The court's reasoning is a masterpiece of good jury deliberation. It is,
unfortunately, not a masterpiece of good appellate review. The court probably was correct in taking as established in the case the propositions of
physical fact from which it drew the inferences, because plaintiff sponsored
those propositions268 and there was no evidence to the contrary. At two other
points, however, the court's reasoning falters.
The first point concerns a proposition of fact that the court refused to
accept as established. A witness who was not, in the opinion of either the
trial judge or the supreme court, "of any real consequence"

269

had testified

that, as he had driven past the accident scene, "he saw to the south of the
(wrecked) cars 'some tracks' that had gone off the east side of the road, back
on the road, off the west side, back on again, and possibly off again on the
east side.' '270 The supreme court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of this
testimony, agreeing that it was "wholly immaterial to the issues and...
not sufficiently connected up.' '271 This means, however, only that the
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

378 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. 1964).
Id. at 538.
Id. at 544.
Id.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 539.
Id.
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testimony did not fit the hypothesis to which the supreme court, like the trial
judge and the highway patrolman, had already committed itself. A hypothesis
that cannot explain all the data may be acceptable in the factual world of
jury determinations, but it is an inappropriate object of judicial notice.
The second doubt concerns the questionable conclusiveness of the inferences drawn by the supreme court as a matter of law from the propositions of fact it did accept as established in the case. Not all of the evidence
given by the patrolman fit the court's hypothesis, nor apparently did some
of it fit the patrolman's own hypothesis. Accepting as established the proposition "that the impact turned the . . . [Cavender car] completely

around,' '272 the court dropped a stitch from the fabric of its explanation saying lamely, "just how we need not say.' '273 There was, furthermore, an inconvenient skidmark about which the court said candidly, "[N]or can we
explain the nineteen-foot arcing skid from... [the Cavender] car's left front
wheel." 27 4 Finally, there were "certain supposed marks, streaks, etc., in
some of the photographs,' '275 which were not in evidence because "the
Highway Patrolman declined to identify these as skidmarks and confined
his testimony to those marks which he had located on the ground and made
notes of.'276 This should have caused the court to doubt whether the record
was sufficiently complete to justify reconstruction as a matter of law. The
unidentified marks may have portrayed marks on the pavement that the
patrolman rejected because they didn't fit his working hypothesis about how
the accident happened. In other words, the patrolman drew his own inferences as he reported the facts. In practical effect, a skeptic might suggest,
the highway patrolman decided the case at the scene. All of these circumstantial doubts taken together would not vitiate a jury verdict reached despite
them; they should have, however, foreclosed the exercise ofjudicial notice.
Williams suggests an inquiry that should soon be pursued. Courts and
commentators treat standards of proof-sufficiency, preponderance, and
overwhelmingness-as if they were constant, value-neutral concepts unaffected by substantive environments and tactical configurations. But are they?
No physical facts case has been found in which a Missouri court has
reconstructed an accident as a matter of law in favor of a plaintiff. If Cavender
had sued Williams, would that case have produced such a precedent? Would
the Missouri Supreme Court have reversed a jury verdict for defendant
Williams as it did for plaintiff Williams? Probably not. The "principle" at
work here may well be a bias in favor of the status quo; proof sufficiently
overwhelming to establish a plaintiffs contributory negligence as a matter
of law is not necessarily sufficiently overwhelming to establish a defendant's
negligence as a matter of law. Standards of proof, far from being constant,
272. Id. at 542.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 540.
276. Id.
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are probably relative to the substantive environments and tactical configurations in which they are applied.
.Fosterv. Sacco277 affords another example of accident reconstruction from
physical facts as a matter of law. Foster sued for the wrongful death of his
wife, who was killed in a head-on collision at the crest of a hill on a gravel
country road. He sought to prove that Sacco had failed to keep her car on
her side of the road. Foster won a verdict'and judgment, notwithstanding
the testimony of Sacco, the sole surviving eyewitness, that Sacco "was driving
on my side of the road and just as we came to the crest of that hill this car
appeared and she was coming right at me. I did my best to turn to the right
...[but] she hit.'' 278
The Kansas City Court of Appeals reversed, saying, "We are unable
to reach any sure or satisfying understanding as to just how this accident
happened. "279 This state of mind should have prompted some respect for
the jury's understanding of how it happened, but the court proceeded to
recreate from the physical facts an understanding sufficiently sure and satisfying to rule that Foster must lose as a matter of law, because Mrs. Foster
had been contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The court conceded
arguendo, as it should have held, that the circumstantial evidence of tire
tracks reasonably attributable to the Sacco car was sufficient to support a
finding that Mrs. Sacco had been one foot over the imaginary center line
of the road at the moment of impact. 280 The court then determined from
testimony and supporting photographs showing impact damage across the
left three feet of each vehicle that Mrs. Foster had also been over the imaginary center line. 281 Foster's judgment was reversed and the cause remanded "with directions to enter a judgment for defendant Sacco ' 282 because
"plaintiff cannot make a submissible case under these facts.' '283 "These
facts" were derived from the testimony of a deputy sheriff and a state trooper,
who had made it clear, as the court acknowledged, that when they arrived,
the accident scene had already been altered by auxiliary firemen, who had
pulled the cars apart with a firetruck. 284 The reader may judge for himself
whether judicial notice was judiciously taken under these circumstances.
2. Visibility as a Matter of Law-The "Look-and-See" Cases
"[T]o look is to see that which is plainly visible," 285 the courts have said,
"and the failure to see what is plainly visible constitutes negligence as a matter
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

343 S.W.2d 171 (Mo. App., K.C. 1960).
Id. at 172.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 177.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173.
Baldwin v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 425 S.W.2d 905, 910 (Mo. 1968).
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of law. "286 The role played by photographs in establishing what was plainly
visible has been discussed in a previous section. 28 7 In two of the principal
cases examined there, the plaintiff was held contributorily negligent as a matter of law; 288 in three others, the defendant contended unsuccessfully that
the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent as a matter of law. 289 The other
frequent strategy for establishing plain visibility applies judicially noticeable
and distances
mathematical calculations to propositions about locations
290
established in the case by the plaintiff's own testimony.
A term like "plainly visible" needs careful definition. It should not mean
that partial obstruction is no obstruction, as it sometimes has, 291 but it must
take into account the teachings of modern science about the physiology and
psychology of human perception, 292 as well as the related commonsense
reality that "a driver's view from a moving vehicle would be different from
a posed situation." 293 It must not hold the driver of a moving vehicle, who
ordinarily must monitor a 180-degree panorama of moving phenomena
filtered through changing patterns of light and shadow, to the same leisurely
and exhaustive scrutiny possible for one examining a still photograph in a
quiet room. Finally, it must recognize that even a physically unobstructed
view may nonetheless be obscured by optical illusion. Several Missouri decisions have shown sensitivity to these considerations.
With respect to partial obstruction of visibility, Van Buskirk v. MissouriKansas-Texas Railroad294 and Ruhl v. MissouriPacific Railroad295 are instructive, although not definitive. In Van Buskirk, the Missouri Supreme Court
affirmed a verdict and judgment for the wrongful deaths of Van Buskirk's
wife and children, even though the railroad's photographs "tended to show
that if Mrs. Van Buskirk had been looking she could have seen the ap-

286. James v. Berry, 301 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Mo. App., Spr. 1957).
287. See Part II.C.2. supra.
288. Davenport v. Wabash R.R., 435 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. 1968); Lohmann v.
Wabash R.R., 364 Mo. 910, 269 S.W.2d 885 (1954).
289. Silvey v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 445 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. 1969); Ruhl v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 304 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1957); Zurnault v. Wabash R.R., 302

S.W.2d 861 (Mo. 1957).
290. See, e.g., Paige v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 323 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1959); Day
v. Union Pac. R.R., 276 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. 1955); Donald v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex.
R.R., 364 Mo. 919, 231 S.W.2d 627 (1950); Wilkins v. Stuecken, 359 Mo. 1047,
225 S.W.2d 131 (1949).
291. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 425 S.W.2d 905 (Mo. 1968);
Bolen v. Rio Rancho Estates, 81 N.M. 307, 466 P.2d 873 (Ct. App. 1970).
292. See generally M. FINEMAN, supranote 190; L. KAUFMAN, PERCEPTION:
THE WORLD TRANSFORMED (1979); L. KAUFMAN, SIGHT AND MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO VISUAL PERCEPTION (1974).
293. Pitts v. Garner, 321 S.W.2d 509, 513 (Mo. 1959).

294.

349 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1961).

295.

304 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. 1957).
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proaching train.' '296 What carried the day was, perhaps, that Van Buskirk's
counsel wisely contended not that one could not see a train approaching the
297
crossing, but that the view was "dangerously and materially obstructed."
In Ruhl, wherein the plaintiff successfully foreclosed the affirmative defense
of contributory negligence in failing to look and see, the supreme court noted,
while making no distinct issue of it, that "on [the railroad's] exhibit seven
only the top third of the locomotive coming from the west is visible. "298
With respect to optical illusions, Gilpin v. Gerbes Supermarket2 99 affords
a precedent that may well deserve wider recognition. Gilpin, an older
woman, fell and was injured while leaving the defendant's store. She fell
when she stepped down a short ramp from the sidewalk to the street,
mistakenly perceiving sidewalk, ramp, and street to be all of one level. "The
ramp was of concrete like the walks above and below, all of a grayish color.
• . There were no colored stripes or other markings on the ramp or the
curb.' '300 Gilpin testified "that she looked right at the place where she was
going to step, and stepped 'right where I looked,' but that all of the area
in front of her looked just like a sidewalk on one level. "301 The trial court
entered judgment for the defendant store notwithstanding ajury verdict for
Gilpin.
On appeal, the defendant argued "that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law 'in that she saw, or in the exercise
of ordinary care should have seen, the ramp.' "302 The Missouri Supreme
Court noted that "the architect who supervised this construction stated that
he had no difficulty in observing the ramps,"33 but rejected the defendant's
argument, reversing the defendant's judgment and remanding the cause for
a new trial. The court conceded "as a usual rule, that a person who looks
at a ramp and curb would discern their true nature, "304 but went on to say
that "this was new construction and, as one witness described it, it was 'just
a white bunch of concrete.' ",305 Virtually as an anticlimax, the court added what would seem to have been the clincher: "[T]wo ladies who visited
the store the same day testified that they had substantially the same optical
experience [as Mrs. Gilpin had had].1"306 To look and see an optical illusion is not contributory negligence-at least, not as a matter of law.

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

349 S.W.2d at 72.
Id. at 70.
304 S.W.2d at 18.
446 S.W.2d 615 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
Id. at 616.

301.

Id. at 617.

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 619.
Id.
Id. at 618.
Id.
Id.
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INVOKING "PHYSICAL FACTS" TO ESTABLISH A
SUBMISSIBLE CASE

This section examines how physical facts reasoning is invoked by plaintiffs to support the argument that a submissible case has been presented.
The discussion applies to all burden-bearers, including defendants asserting counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party claims, or affirmative defenses.
Virtually all of the cases in this section arose from motor vehicle collisions
that left no living eyewitnesses. Thus, the plaintiffs, of necessity, relied for
their proof on circumstantial evidence, characterized as physical facts and
composed of proof about the location, extensity, and intensity of skidmarks
and gouges; the location, nature, and severity of damage to vehicles; the
postaccident positions of vehicles; and the location, kind, and quantity of
impact debris. In some of these cases, proof of physical facts alone was held
sufficient to make a submissible case; in others, such proof was held insufficient. Although damage to vehicles and postaccident positions of vehicles
have played persuasive roles in accident reconstruction, a series of Missouri
precedents has established the special significance of skidmarks. Proof about
debris has, typically, played the least significant role.
A.

"Physical Facts" Alone Sufficient

In Thompson v. Jenkins,3 0 7 the trial court had directed a verdict against
Thompson on counsel's opening statement of the circumstantial evidence
on which Thompson's case depended. Both Thompson's wife andJenkins'
decedent had been killed in the collision. The damage to the Thompson car
started on its left side just back of the bumper, which was intact, and
progressively increased toward the rear until at the center post.the
car was crushed to a width of only 18 inches, and its left side was
buckled, causing its left rear to extend a short distance west [Jenkins's
30 8
side] of the center line.

The damage to the Jenkins car was "on its front, with the heavy damage
at its left front end, which was mashed back." 30 9 The front of the Jenkins
car "extended into the east [Thompson's] lane of the highway, pointing into
the [Thompson car]. "310 There were no skidmarks, but there was "debris,
glass and chrome, two to four feet east of the pavement and just north and
east of the [Thompson car]."

31

'

The Missouri Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial, saying,
[W]e think a jury may reasonably infer.., that the... [Jenkins
car] was moving toward and into the east lane and into the ...
[Thompson car] at the instant of impact, and that the force of the
impact was such as to cause the... [Thompson car] to buckle and
307.

330 S.W.2d 802 (Mo. 1959).

308.
309.

Id. at 805.
Id.

310.

Id.

311.

Id. at 804.
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a part of its left rear end to extend into the west lane of the highway.3 12
The opinion makes a point by something it does not say. Nowhere do the
words "physical facts" appear, and yet the case is typical of the kinds of
circumstantial evidence often characterized as "physical facts." There are
other Missouri cases relevant to a study of circumstantial evidence that do
3 13
not contain the magic words.

In Lyon v. Southard,314 Lyon sued Southard for the wrongful death of her
husband. Because there were no surviving eyewitnesses to the collison, the
accident had to be reconstructed from circumstantial evidence. The trial court
entered judgment for Southard notwithstanding ajury verdict for Lyon. The
Missouri Supreme Court reinstated Lyon's verdict and judgment, saying
that "the physical facts found at the scene' '315 justified "a finding by ajury
that Southard was driving at a high and negligent speed.' '316 In addition
to testimony about the postcollision positions of the vehicles and the location of debris, there was evidence that
[t]ire or skid marks evidently made by the [Southard] Chevrolet were
found on the roadway beginning about 30 or 40 feet west from the
crest of the hill, thence straight west for a distance of about 258 feet
to the point of collision and then westerly and slightly to
the north
about 33 feet to the point where the cars were found. 317
Turning to the evidence about damage, the supreme court said, "Both cars
were completely demolished. The [Lyon] Oldsmobile was bent into a 'rainbow shape.' From the marks on the roadway, it would appear that by the
force of the impact the Chevrolet lifted the Oldsmobile off the pavement and
3 18
deposited it 33 feet to the west."1

In Fellows v. Farmer,319 an action arising out of a one-car accident brought
by the representative of the deceased passenger against the representative
of the deceased driver, circumstantial evidence was held sufficient to submit the driver's negligence under res ipsa loquitur. Affirming a verdict and
judgment for Fellows, the Springfield Court of Appeals said, "[F]rom the
physical facts ascertained by... [the highway patrolman] in his investigation and by him explained upon trial with the aid of photographic exhibits,

312.
313.

Id. at 805-06.
See, e.g., Ochs v. Wilson, 427 S.W.2d 748 (Mo. App., St. L. 1968);

Stonefield v. Flynn, 347 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. App., St. L. 1961). Circumstantial
evidence cases lacking the words "physical facts" have not been examined herein
because this Article has focused on the part played by "physical facts" rhetoric in
the jurisprudence of circumstantial evidence. Furthermore, those cases would not
require any significant changes in the analyses offered herein.
314. 323 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1959).
315. Id. at 786.
316. Id. at 787.
317. Id.

318.
319.

Id.
379 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. App., Spr. 1964).
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the jury reasonably might have inferred and found that" the driver," [a]pparently traveling at a high rate of speed," had lost control in the curve approaching the bridge from the south; had gone off the road and missed the
bridge; "and then had hurtled through space over the creek bed.., a distance
of approximately fifty feet to and against the vertical concrete wall or 'wing'
extending upstream at the north end of the bridge,.... and fell to rest in the

[creek bed]." 320
In Lott v. Kjar,3 21 testimony describing the physical facts at an accident
scene was implicitly sufficient to make a submissible case but not persuasive
enough to win a jury verdict. Vehicles driven by Lott and Kjar collided in
the westbound lanes of the highway, killing them both. Whoever was eastbound was on the wrong side of the median. Both Lott's widow and Kjar's
administrator contended that the other driver was eastbound. There were
no eyewitnesses. The physical facts comprising the accident scene tended
to support the inference that Kjar was eastbound; at least, the investigating
highway patrolman would have so testified had the trial court permitted.
The other circumstantial evidence tended to support the inference that Lott
was eastbound. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed ajudgment for Kjar's
administrator.
B.

"Physical Facts" Alone Not Sufficient

In Williams v. Cavender,322 the Missouri Supreme Court reversed ajudgment for Williams and ordered entry of judgment for Cavender, holding
alternatively that the highway patrolman's testimony placing skidmarks,
did not make a submissible case
damage, postcollision positions, and debris
323

.of the deceased Cavender's negligence.

In Helton v. Huckeba,324 Helton adduced evidence of physical factslocation of debris, an arcing sideskidding mark to the left rear tire of the
Chevrolet in which her decedent husband had been riding, and a mark or
scratch arcing across the pavement to the right front wheel of the Chevroletnot to nullify defendant Huckeba's direct testimony that the Chevrolet had
come over on his side of the road, but merely to make a submissible case
that Huckeba had come over on the Chevrolet's side of the road. The Springfield Court of Appeals held her evidence insufficient.3 25 In the court's view,
other circumstantial evidence-particularly the fact established by the
326
testimony of Helton's own witnesses and portrayed by her own photograph
that both the Chevrolet and the Huckeba Ford were most severely damag320. Id. at 845.
321. 378 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1964).
322. 378 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. 1964).
323. Id. at 544. See notes 264-76 and accompanying text supra.
324. 270 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. App., Spr. 1954).
325. Id. at 492 (citing Ruby v. Clark, 357 Mo. 318, 208 S.W.2d 251 (1948),
and Schoen v. Plaza Express Co., 206 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. 1947)).
326. 270 S.W.2d at 489, 494-95.
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ed on the right front, and the location of the vehicles after the collision
established by the official highway patrol report apparently acquiesced in
by the parties 327-strongly corroborated Huckeba's testimony that he had
tried to miss the Chevrolet to its left when it appeared suddenly in his lane.
Indeed, even the location of the debris, according to the court, was best interpreted as corroborative of Huckeba's testimony. 32 Although it would
clearly have been wrong to nullify Huckeba's direct testimony by the facts
on which Helton relied, it was also wrong to hold her circumstantial evidence
3

insufficient.

29

In several cases, testimony about physical facts plus other testimony was
held sufficient. 330 The term physical facts has also worked its way into a fre33 1
quently stated sufficiency formula.
327.

Id. at 491.

328. Id. at 495.
329. See Thompson v. Jenkins, 330 S.W.2d 802 (Mo. 1959); notes 307-13 and
accompanying text supra.
330. See, e.g., Welch v. Hyatt, 578 S.W.2d 905 (Mo. En Banc 1979); Carter
v. Consolidated Cabs, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1973); Commerford v. Kreitler,
462 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. 1971); Headrick v. Dowdy, 450 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1970);
Hamilton v. Slover, 440 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. 1969); State v. Aston, 412 S.W.2d 175
(Mo. 1967); Prentzlerv. Schneider, 411 S.W.2d 135 (Mo. En Banc 1966); Moore
v. Eden, 405 S.W.2d 910 (Mo. 1966); Hale v. Kansas City S.R.R., 363 S.W.2d
542 (Mo. 1963); State v. Morris, 307 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1957); Filkins v. Snavely,
359 Mo. 356, 221 S.W.2d 736 (1949); Raines v. Yost, 539 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. App.,
K.C. 1976); State v. McClain, 531 S.W.2d 40 (Mo. App., K.C. 1975).
331. See, e.g., Epple v. Western Auto Supply Co., 548 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. En
Banc 1977); Vaeth v. Gegg, 486 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. 1972); Houghton v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry., 446 S.W.2d 406 (Mo. En Banc 1969); Hewitt v. Masters, 406
S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1966); State v. Lee, 404 S.W.2d 740 (Mo. 1966); Taylor v. Riddle, 384 S.W.2d 569 (Mo. 1964); Boydston v. Burton, 379 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. 1964);
Probst v. Seyer, 353 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1962); State v. Markway, 353 S.W.2d 727
(Mo. 1962); State v. Baugh, 323 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. En Banc 1959); State v. Palmer,
306 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1957); Capra v. Phillips Inv. Co., 302 S.W.2d 924 (Mo.
En Banc 1957); State v. Eaves, 362 Mo. 670, 243 S.W.2d 129 (1951); State v. Weekly, 223 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1949); State v. Wood, 355 Mo. 1008, 199 S.W.2d 396
(1947); State v. Burton, 355 Mo. 792, 198 S.W.2d 19 (1946); Grant v. National
Super Markets, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); State v. Phillips,
585 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. App., S.D. 1979); State v. Russell, 581 S.W.2d 61 (Mo.
App., S.D. 1979); State v. Leigh, 580 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979);
Wiseman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 575 S.W.2d 742 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); White
v. Gallion, 573 S.W.2d 682 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); Becker v. Finke, 567 S.W.2d
136 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978); State v. Tripp, 558 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. App., K.C.
1977); Frazier v. Stone, 515 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. App., Spr. 1974); Crull v. Gleb,
382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App., St. L. 1964); Hotchner v. Liebowits, 341 S.W.2d 319
(Mo. App., St. L. 1960); Johnson v. Weston, 330 S.W.2d 160 (Mo. App., St. L.
1959); Harrellson v. Barks, 326 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. App., Spr. 1959); Nolan v. Joplin

Transfer & Storage Co., 239 Mo. App. 915, 203 S.W.2d 740 (Spr. 1947).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982

55

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
C.

[Vol. 47

Special Significance of Skidmarks

Although damage to vehicles and postaccident positions of vehicles have
played persuasive roles in accident reconstruction, a series of Missouri
precedents has established the special significance of skidmarks. In Berry v.
Harmon,332 in which there was no skidmark evidence, the Missouri Supreme
Court held Berry's circumstantial evidence consisting of debris and the
postaccident positions of the vehicles insufficient to make a submissible case.
Although this evidence seemed strongly to favor Berry, the court said, "In
this case it is difficult to say just what inferences are possible from the location of the grease and debris on the east side of the pavement and shoulder
334 the court said, "But in the
. . . ,,333 In distinguishing Brawley v. Esterly,
Brawley case there were the cogent, forceful circumstances of plainly observable 'black marks' on the pavement ....In this case there were no telling
skid marks 'at all' and no gouged-out place on the highway." 335 The court
similarly distinguished Helton v. Huckeba,336 saying, "[I]n addition to the
debris and its location there were again the telling 'marks' on the
pavement.

337

The court also cited and described Filkins v. Snavely, 338 saying, "But there
again there was 'a freshly gouged-out place ...and there were scratches
leading back from it toward the coupe.

139

In Filkins, wherein the coupe in

which the plaintiff's decedent was riding and the truck operated by defendant were both found on the coupe's side of the highway, the Missouri
Supreme Court distinguished Schoen v. PlazaExpress Company, 340 cited by the
defendant, as follows:" [B]ut most important, there were no such markings
[in Schoen] of the place of the collision as the gouge east of the center line
in this case and the scratches leading directly from it to the broken front axle of the coupe.' '341 Thus, the Filkins court concluded that "there was not
sufficient circumstantial evidence [in Schoen] to show that defendant's vehicle was being operated so as to extend over the center line of the pavement;
but, in this case, our conclusion is that there was." 342 It should also be recalled
that in a later case, Williams v. Cavender,343 the supreme court confidently
reconstructed an iccident to which there were no surviving eyewitnesses prin332. 323 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1959).
333. Id. at 695.
334. 267 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. 1954).
335. 323 S.W.2d at 695.
336. 270 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. App., Spr. 1954). See notes 324-28 and accompanying text supra.
337. 323 S.W.2d at 695.
338. 359 Mo. 356, 221 S.W.2d 736 (1949).
339. 323 S.W.2d at 696.
340. 206 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. 1947).
341. 221 S.W.2d at 737.
342. Id.
343. 378 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. 1964). See notes 264-76 and accompanying text supra.
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cipally on the strength of the skidmarks reported by the investigating highway
patrolman.
Gurwellv. Jefferson City Lines344 seems on its face to detract from the proposition that skidmarks are of special significance, but closer examination
reveals otherwise and affords, as well, a reminder about the first requirement of the physical facts equation. Gurwell had testified that his pickup
truck was standing still on his own side of the street when struck by defendant's bus. Defendant argued on appeal that this testimony should be
nullified because at least part of the skidmarks attributable to the pickup were
found on the bus' side of the street.3 45 Rejecting this argument, the Kansas
City Court of Appeals said, "We cannot say that proof of the location of
the skid marks, standing alone, constitutes proof of such a physical fact as
to completely overcome and nullify the force of the positive eyewitness
346
testimony of both plaintiff and ... [plaintiff's helper]."
Two points are worthy of consideration. First, this was not a case in which
only circumstantial evidence was available. Had it been, the court might
well have held the evidence of skidmarks sufficient to submit contributory
negligence. Of more importance, however, was the circumstance that the
precise location of the skidmarks was never conclusively established in the
case. Two policemen did testify on defendant's behalf that at least part of
the skidmarks attributable to the pickup were found on the bus' side of the
street.3 47 The plaintiffs employer, however, who had examined the scene
very shortly after the collision, testified that the skidmarks attributable to
'the pickup were entirely on the pickup's side of the street.3 48 Another witness
produced by the defendant, a policeman, gave "testimony in regard to location of the skid marks [that was] confusing and contradictory, and he finally said: 'I just don't know.' "149 Judicially noticeable conclusions cannot
be drawn from propositions of fact so tenuously in evidence.
D.

Limited Significance of Debris

In Williams v. Cavender,350 the Missouri Supreme Court said, "The location of the debris is not in itself conclusive. "351 This was echoed in Thompson v. Gray352 by the Springfield Court of Appeals, which said, "[T]he location of the debris ... was not conclusive proof of the point of impact, nor
the manner in which the accident occurred. 353 Moreover, it has been said
that Missouri law formerly mandated that debris, in the absence of other
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

239 Mo. App. 305, 192 S.W.2d 683 (K.C. 1946).
Id. at 314, 192 S.W.2d at 688.
Id.
Id. at 311, 192 S.W.2d at 686.
Id. at 309-10, 192 S.W.2d at 686.
Id. at 311, 192 S.W.2d at 686-87.
378 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. 1964).
Id. at 543.

352. 415 S.W.2d 299 (Mo. App., Spr. 1967).
353. Id. at 306.
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physical evidence, was not even sufficient to submit point of impact.3 54 It
has also been said, however, that Hodge v. Goffstein 35 5 "indicates that the
Missouri courts will now accept physical evidence in terms of locating the
center of resultant debris (as long as it is not too widespread) as substantial
evidence of the cause and point of impact.''356
V.

INVOKING "PHYSICAL FACTS" INJURY ARGUMENTS

In several reported decisions, it has appeared incidentally that counsel
have invoked "physical facts" in arguments to the juries. 357 The decisions
did not turn on this point. Because physical facts reasoning may entirely
deprive the jury of an issue, arguing physical facts to the jury should, a fortiori, be permitted, subject only to the usual rules about improper
358

argument.

VI.

INVOKING "PHYSICAL FACTS" FOR MISCELLANEOUS PURPOSES

The very presence in Missouri's legal lexicon of a spell so invocative
as "physical facts" has seemed occasionally to inspire impressionable counsel
to extraordinary ingenuity.
InMcCrary v. Ogden,3 59 the McCrarys had ajudgment for the wrongful
death of their minor son in a collision with Ogden's truck. One contention
on appeal was that the McCrarys had not made a submissible case. As a
part of this contention, the defendants attacked the competency of the
McCrarys' sole eyewitness, a thirty-eight-year old "low grade moron with
the mentality of a child about seven years of age.' '360 Among other things,
the defendants argued "that Shirley's incompetency was demonstrated
3 61
because.., some of his testimony was contrary to physical facts and laws."
The Missouri Supreme Court remarked on the novelty of the defendants'
argument, observing, "It should be noted that defendants do not contend
that Shirley's testimony should be disregarded because it was so inconsistent and contrary to common experience and physical laws as to destroy its
probative effect.' '362 The court dismissed the defendants' physical facts argument almost offhandedly, saying, "We note that defendants did not impeach
the credibility of the witness on cross-examination at the trial by develop354. See 13 ST. LOUIS L.J. 616 (1969).
355. 411 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. 1966).
356. 13 ST. Louis L.J. 616,621 (1969).
357. See, e.g., Finke v. United Film Serv., 363 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1962); Lynn
v. Kern, 323 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. 1959); Dodd v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 353 Mo.
799, 184 S.W.2d 454 (1945).

358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

See note 24 supra.
267 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1954).
Id. at 672.
Id. at 674.
Id.
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ing the same matters which were brought out on cross-examination at the
hearing before the court. "363 The court held, affirming the McCrarys' judgment, that they had made a submissible case.
Counsel in Clark v. McKeone364 exhibited similar ingenuity. Clark appealed from a judgment for the defendants. Her counsel was particularly
aggrieved by the testimony of the codefendant truck driver, which was, he
contended, subject to "seven physical impossibilities.' '365 In the tactical
posture of the case, however, "the burden was on the plaintiff to persuade
and convince the jury-and it... [was] immaterial whether there was any
evidence favorable to the defendant. "366 Thus, arguing for the nullification
of the driver's testimony was pointless, but Clark's counsel pressed on undaunted. In the words of the Missouri Supreme Court, "Counsel does not
ask that this court weigh the evidence but urges that if... [the truck driver's]
evidence is excluded under the rule of physical impossibility that it at once
becomes apparent that Mrs. Clark did not have a fair trial.' '367 This novel
attempt was rejected, but as long as the magic words survive there will be
others.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Appellate courts sometimes acquire their own strongly held feeling for
what actually happened in the human drama portrayed by a certain trial
record under review. If this feeling does not coincide with the jury's verdict, the court overrides the jury, employing the apparently value-neutral
rhetoric of the jurisprudence of proof to make the result seem compelled by
principle. It is not appropriate even for intermediate courts of appeal to act
as centralized "superjuries"; much less is it appropriate for supreme courts
to do so.
Like many of its sister courts, the Missouri Supreme Court has, in the
past, entertained too many jury issues. It may still be doing so, althbugh
certainly to a lesser extent since the constitutional amendments concerning
appellate jurisdiction adopted in 1970 and 1976. Even considering their
responsibility to review for correctness, the intermediate courts of appeal
also have entertained and arguably continue to entertain too many jury
issues. Virtually every decision cited in this Article supports the foregoing
propositions. An appellate court cannot amend the constitutional and
statutory schemes of which it is a part, but it can, within limits, lessen its
workload by carefully placed decisional signals. One such signal would make
it clear that jury verdicts are no longer vulnerable on appeal to physical facts
arguments.
363.

Id.

364.

234 S.W.2d 574 (Mo. 1950).

365.

Id. at 576.

366.

Id.

367. Id.
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Trial judges perhaps should not be held accountable for their judgments
about the sufficiency of evidence. Perhaps, in this era of crowded calendars
and sharply conflicting values, the judiciary needs "a whole set of rules solid
in sound but vague in application which ajudge can wield to terminate cases
that seem obvious to him." 368 But I don't think so. If rationality within controlling principles is to be tempered by value judgment, whether rigorous
or merciful, let the jury do it. Let the judge bind himself to the law as Ulysses
to the mast. Armed with a consummate understanding of the jurisprudence
of proof, including a good grasp of physical facts reasoning, competent attorneys can help him tie the knots.
368.

Hoffman, supra note 1, at 69.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss3/1

60

